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ABSTRACT 
Rumors can be a perfect tool to subvert, deceive, or suggest what truth is to a 
population. However, despite the demonstrated ability of rumors to influence a 
population, current U.S. military doctrine does not address how to recognize, craft, or 
effectively counter them.  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the principles and concepts governing the 
spread of rumors for their future integration into Psychological Operations forces 
(PSYOP) doctrine and training. Specifically, this study draws from a review of current 
and historical literature on rumor theory to distill a set of principles to guide the 
successful employment of rumors, as well as a set of principles for defending against the 
employment of rumors by an adversary. These principles are then tested by the case study 
analysis of three examples of successful rumor generation, as well as two successful 
examples and one unsuccessful case of rumor defense. From its investigation, this study 
proposes two new models to assist the influence practitioner in the employment of and 
defense against rumors. 
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I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
A. BACKGROUND 
At some point in their lives, all Americans have heard, spread, or been the subject 
of a rumor. Most rumors are relatively benign, providing titillating topics of conversation 
for social groups. However, other rumors have caused significant damage, such as a 
rumor about a white police officer’s murder of a young minority that sparked the 1935 
Harlem Race Riot, resulting in the destruction of millions of dollars’ worth of property, 
three deaths, and hundreds of injuries.1 Depending on the topic and their method of 
circulation, rumors can be a powerful tool for mobilizing people and shaping behavior. 
In today’s anxiety-laden security environment, rumors can provide unique 
insights into the current grievances and fears of a given population; they can also act as 
powerful agents of influence. For example, by propagating rumors about civilian abuses 
at the hands of the government or military, an adversary can foster a sense of uncertainty 
and sow distrust between a government and its population. Conversely, by evaluating and 
understanding rumors currently circulating through a population, a government or 
military force can overcome obstacles to its programs, and can provide targeted messages 
of reassurance to the populace when necessary. Given the importance of rumors in 
today’s security environment, who in the United States (U.S.) military is charged with 
wielding rumors as an influence tool and for countering their negative effects?  
This thesis aims to investigate a missing dimension of U.S. military information 
operations in the post-September 11 security environment: the opportunities and threats 
posed by rumors. This study explores rumor theory from a military perspective, including 
how it applies to the recognition, implementation, and countering of rumors. Specifically, 
this study examines the characteristics of successfully propagated rumors, and how 
organizations have dealt with rumors employed against them.  
                                                 




Psychologist Ralph Rosnow defines rumor as unverified information, relevant to 
the group of persons involved in its dissemination, which thrives when there is ambiguity 
and uncertainty.2 As Bordia and Difonzo assert, rumor is a form of interpersonal 
communication, within a group, which is intended to “reduce anxiety via a process of 
social sense-making.”3 What separates news from rumor is that news is substantiated 
information emanating from an authoritative source. What separates gossip from rumor is 
that gossip is considered idle talk, which is important to a limited few, and maintains 
little significance beyond those with whom it originates.4  
Rumors are significant because of their ability to influence populations directly. A 
rumor can act as a perfect tool to subvert, deceive, and to suggest what truth is. Rumors 
have the greatest impact when “truth becomes less about facts and evidence and more 
about coherence with pre-existing and prevailing understandings.”5 When a well-crafted 
rumor is disseminated via a clandestine source, the rumor can quickly spread and can 
have lasting effect on the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of a given target 
audience.6  
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis investigates literature and historic military doctrine on the subject of 
rumors. From this investigation, it posits that five criteria must be satisfied for the 
successful propagation of rumors (plausibility, simplicity, suitability, vividness, and 
suggestiveness), and that six criteria must be adhered to in the defense against rumors 
(reduce anxiety and uncertainty, limit means of dissemination, ignore impotent rumors, 
comment on plausible rumors, confirm the truth, refute effectively). From these criteria, 
                                                 
2 Ralph L. Rosnow, “Psychology of Rumor Reconsidered,” Psychological Bulletin 87, no. 3 (1980): 
578–591. 
3 Prashant Bordia and Nicholas Difonzo, “Problem Solving in Social Interactions on the Internet: 
Rumor as a Contagion,” Social Psychology Quarterly 67, no. 1 (2004): 33. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Daniel Bernardi, Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism, and the Struggle for Strategic 
Influence (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 3, http://site.ebrary.com/id/10593846. 
6 “General Ludendorff is quoted as saying that rumor is the most dangerous means of propaganda 
precisely because beliefs are planted from sources that cannot be traced.” Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised 
News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 190. 
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this thesis conducts an in-depth analysis of five case studies, in which rumors were 
successfully employed, either offensively or as counter measures, and one case study 
where rumors were unsuccessfully managed. The selected cases are drawn from different 
regions of the world over a span of 70 years and include examples of rumors in times of 
war, as well as in peace.  
The selected cases are grouped into two sets, one that looks at the employment of 
rumors and the other that looks at countering rumors. The first set of successful rumor 
propagation includes a rumor that the British could set the English Channel on fire during 
World War II to thwart German attempts at invasion; a rumor which claimed the 
September 11 attacks were a Zionist plot; and a rumor that discredited terrorist leader 
Noordin Top after his death. The second set on countering rumors includes the defense 
against a rumor that inflated the effects of polio on Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) 
during his 1932 campaign for the American presidency; the successful defense of a rumor 
that instigated a boycott against the retailer Carrefour in China in 2008; and rumors 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom that claimed American forces were attempting to starve 
the Iraqi population into submission by killing livestock and destroying crops. These 
cases include historical examples of rumor propagation, as well as two contemporary 
cases, to consider how technology has changed the spread and counter of rumors. 
Furthermore, each set contains both Western and non-Western examples, as well as 
military and non-military examples of rumors, to allow for a breadth of cultural contexts.  
From this investigation, the thesis develops two unique models for employing or 
defending against rumors. The first model, the Rumor Employment Cycle (REC) is 
designed for rumor employment; specifically, it is a planning tool that can help influence 
practitioners in crafting, synchronizing, spreading, and evaluating rumors. The second 
model, Rumor Defense Process (RDP) is designed for rumor defense, which incorporates 
and expands upon concepts drawn from literature on defeating rumors to help coordinate 
the prevention and neutralization of rumors by a military staff.  
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C. FINDINGS 
The studied cases yield the following findings. First, rumors are a powerful form 
of influence, which can be leveraged against individuals, groups, and networks. 
Specifically, the following criteria are required for rumor effectiveness: plausibility, 
simplicity, suitability, vividness, and suggestiveness. Second, with regard to countering 
rumors, a mixture of proactive and reactive measures is needed, including reducing 
environmental anxiety and uncertainty, as well as limiting the means of rumor 
dissemination. Reactive measures include ignoring impotent rumors, commenting on 
plausible rumors, confirming the truth, and refuting rumors effectively. Additionally, 
such measures must be enacted at the first available opportunity since rumors over time 
begin to be perceived as facts, thus, making it harder to dislodge them from the 
population’s psyche.  
Based on these findings and review of literature, the thesis recommends that the 
current gap in U.S. influence doctrine may be addressed by incorporating the two models 
developed in the thesis that govern rumor propagation and defense, the REC and RDP, 
respectively. This inclusion will help provide soldiers with a functional knowledge of 
how to recognize, implement, and counter rumors effectively in today’s operational 
environment.  
D. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
This study proceeds in Chapter II with a review of historical and current literature 
on the subject of rumors. First, Chapter II provides a base knowledge of rumor theory by 
assessing significant publications in both academic and historic military doctrine. Next, 
the chapter describes different types of influence operations and influence techniques in 
their relation to rumors. Then, by synthesizing previous studies on the subject of rumor, 
the chapter proposes two sets of principles guiding the effective propagation and defense 
against rumors. The first set of principles covers the propagation of rumors, which 
observe that successful rumors are characteristically uncomplicated and easy to 
remember; they are based on the current interests and circumstances of their audience; 
they exploit emotions and sentiments, and they follow historical precedents. The chapter 
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asserts that successfully propagating rumors requires the satisfaction of five criteria: 
plausibility, simplicity, suitability, vividness, and—in some cases—suggestiveness. The 
second set of principles covers the defense against rumors, which observes that a 
successful defense requires adherence to the following guidelines: being prepared to deal 
with rumors, taking prompt action once rumors emerge, staying on message when 
refuting rumors, controlling the narrative, minimizing misunderstanding when refuting 
rumors, and taking responsibility for the truthful elements of any rumor. Under the 
guidelines for defense, two sets of criteria are given for preventing and neutralizing 
rumors. Preventing rumors requires reducing environmental anxiety and ambiguity, while 
limiting an adversary’s means to disseminate rumors. Neutralizing rumors requires 
ignoring those that are impotent, commenting on those that are plausible, confirming the 
truth, and refuting falsehoods effectively. This chapter closes with a discussion on the 
implications of technology for the reach and impact of a rumor. 
Chapter III analyzes three cases of successful rumor employment: the British 
incendiary anti-invasion weapon rumor, the Zionist pre-warning and involvement in 9/11 
rumor, and the rumor tarnishing Noordin Top’s legacy as a terrorist leader. The analysis 
of these cases supports the validation of all five criteria of rumor employment, with all of 
the criteria being satisfied in each case. Furthermore, where the proposed criteria are not 
satisfied, or where the criteria conflict with one another, a rumor will not become self-
propelling or will become unrecognizably distorted from its original form, thus failing to 
propagate effectively and influence the intended audience. 
Chapter IV considers three cases in which rumors were both successfully and 
unsuccessfully countered: negating rumors of FDR’s poor health, refuting rumors of the 
French retailer Carrefour’s support to Tibet, and the failure to counter rumors hindering 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The analysis of these cases demonstrates the need for an 
organization to conduct methodical scanning of the information environment for 
conditions favoring rumor generation; to act transparently, ethically, and responsibly in 
public; and to eliminate known sources of rumor by restricting mediums or channels 
through which rumors propagate. Furthermore, the case studies reveal the importance of 
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considering rumors from the perspective of the target audience, and taking seriously 
rumors that are plausible to the target audience. 
Chapter V begins by emphasizing the principles of rumor employment and 
defense to be incorporated into the future doctrine and training of Psychological 
Operations forces (PSYOP). The study concludes with the proposal of two new models 
based on the case study findings, conclusions drawn after assessing the academic 
literature on the subject of rumors, and the review and recognition of a gap in current 
U.S. military doctrine. These models—the REC and the RDP—are designed to help assist 
the influence practitioner with the employment of, and defense against, rumors in the 
modern security environment. 
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II. PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS OF RUMOR THEORY  
FOR MILITARY APPLICATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Incorporating rumors into future U.S. military doctrine and training requires, first, 
a review of historical and current literature on the subject. Therefore, this chapter begins 
by deriving a base of knowledge of rumor theory from significant publications in both 
academic literature and historic military doctrine. This chapter also describes two sets of 
principles that explain how rumors are effectively employed and how to defend against 
them. Finally, this chapter closes with a discussion on the implications of technology, 
specifically how it affects rumor propagation and effectiveness. 
B. RUMORS AND RUMOR PROPAGATION 
The first publication of significance regarding rumor theory was made by Robert 
H. Knapp with his 1944 study, A Psychology of Rumor.7 Knapp wrote about the 
environmental conditions that foster rumors. He also classified rumors into categories 
based on their purpose: the wish rumor, expressing the hopes of the target audience; the 
bogie rumor, expressing the fears and anxieties of the target audience; and the aggression 
rumor, which is motivated by aggression or hatred, and is directed against members of 
one’s own population.8 Modern theorists did not retain Knapp’s system of categorization, 
but they have agreed with Knapp’s two basic suppositions that rumors provide 
populations with unverified information, and that they satisfy “some emotional need”9 for 
those who circulate the information. 
Around the same time as Knapp, Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman established 
themselves as the most historically relevant theorists regarding rumor. In The Psychology 
of Rumor (1947), Allport and Postman capture the fundamental tenets of rumor theory.10 
                                                 
7 Robert H. Knapp, “A Psychology of Rumor,” Public Opinion Quarterly 8, (1944): 22–37.  
8 Ibid., 27.  
9 Ibid., 23.  
10 Gordon W. Allport and Leo Joseph Postman, The Psychology of Rumor (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1965). 
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They posit what became known as the basic law of rumor, , where the intensity 
of rumor spread  is proportional to the importance of the rumor to the individual  
times the ambiguity surrounding the event .11 Furthermore, a rumor is more infectious 
in times of uncertainty, when little information is being released through authoritative 
channels, and when the unofficial information in circulation is of significance to the 
population in which it is circulated.12 Other theorists support the notion that crafting and 
transmitting rumors help people cope with the unknown and that “the more perplexing 
the situation, the more urgent will be [the] need to impose credible meaning and 
organization in order to guide our behavior in the uncertain future.”13 
Allport and Postman were also the first theorists to study the transmission of 
rumors in a controlled setting. Their study provided insight to three aspects of 
information distortion within rumor propagation: leveling—as information travels it,  
tends to grow shorter, more concise, more easily grasped and told” for 
ease of transmission; sharpening—individuals selectively choose what 
points they want to emphasize to ensure the message is enticing enough to 
survive; and assimilation—the individual receiving the information will do 
so only if it conforms to their previously established “emotions, attitudes, 
and prejudices.14  
Most modern theorists rebut the clinical findings of Allport and Postman by 
noting that, outside of a controlled environment, rumors are a social phenomenon that 
spreads throughout groups of like-minded individuals until the rumor is dismissed after 
being proven untrue by the group through a process of testing and clarification. For 
example, Caplow argues that, within a group,  
a rumor is usually heard more than once and usually transmitted more than 
once by each individual, and this re-circulation tends to eliminate variation 
and if circumstances allow sufficient time, the final form of a rumor for a 
                                                 
11 Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, “An Analysis of Rumor,” Public Opinion Quarterly 10, 
(1947): 502. 
12 Stanley Schachter and Harvey Burdick, “A Field Experiment on Rumor Transmission and 
Distortion,” Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology 50, no. 3 (May 1955): 368. 
13 Ralph P. Rosnow, “Inside Rumor: A Personal Journey,” American Psychologist 46, no. 5 (1991): 
488.  
14 Allport and Postman, “An Analysis of Rumor,” 505.  
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sizeable percentage of the group may be a statement in prescribed form 
with a high degree of consensus on every word.15  
This process of clarifying and assimilating a rumor within a group has most recently been 
argued in 2004 by Prashant Bordia and Nicholas Difonzo.16 Bordia and Difonzo 
proposed a four-stage process of rumor propagation through a group, likening it to a 
conversation with an “exchange of ideas, opinions, and viewpoints,” where “people 
attempt to persuade others to believe or disbelieve the rumor by providing confirming or 
disconfirming information, often backed by personal experiences.”17 
Historically, theorists had agreed that the distinct mode of rumor transmission was 
carried out through face-to-face conversations, which increased accountability and 
criticality with regard to processing new information.18 The advent of the Internet has 
challenged earlier hypotheses about the transmission of rumors and, to some extent, has 
negated the need for accountability and credibility of the source.19 Although multiple 
sources are available against which to cross check unverified information, a rumor can be 
sown into multiple sources, thus confirming—or at least supporting—the rumor’s 
validity. Essentially, groups may have greater access to information, but they do not have 
the benefit of conducting the kind of face-to-face interaction needed to strip away 
falsehoods.20 Regarding false rumors, the danger of the Internet is that, although the truth 
is always trying to win out, it often “fails to catch up with a lie”21 before new and 
unverified information is introduced for consumption. The Internet is now an indisputable 
source of rumor generation and, deserves study in how it affects the spread and 
                                                 
15 Theodore Caplow, “Rumors in War,” Social Forces 25, no. 1 (1946): 301.  
16 Bordia and Difonzo, “Problem Solving in Social Interactions on the Internet.” 
17 Ibid., 47. 
18 Robert Knapp stated that one of the three characteristics of rumor was that it had “a distinct and 
characteristic mode of transmission—mostly by word of mouth.” Knapp, “A Psychology of Rumor,” 22. 
19 Ann P. Mintz, “Introduction,” in Web of Deceit: Misinformation and Manipulation in the Age of 
Social Media, ed. Ann P. Mintz (Medford, NJ: Information Today, 2012). 
20 Ibid., x. 
21 Cass R. Sunstein, On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, and What Can Be 
Done (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 70.  
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acceptance of rumors. This point is further elaborated later in this chapter, and throughout 
the case studies in subsequent chapters. 
C. RUMOR THEORY IN U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE 
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner to the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and U.S. military Special Operations Forces (SOF), originally published 
tenets of rumor theory in their manuals as part of efforts to counter Axis powers during 
World War II.22 Together with Robert Knapp, the OSS prescribed criteria by which 
rumors could be applied as part of the wider military effort in a white paper entitled 
“Doctrine Re Rumors,” which became the foundation for OSS doctrine on the subject of 
rumors within its Morale Operations Branch.23 
The role of rumors has been largely ignored in psychological operations doctrine 
since the time of the OSS. From the 1960s to the present, rumors have rarely been 
mentioned in psychological operations doctrine and little discussion is given to the 
application or techniques for implementing rumors by friendly forces.24 Although 
modern doctrine charges U.S. psychological operations soldiers to defeat rumors 
employed by the enemy, doctrine does not provide knowledge on how to recognize, 
counter, or effectively craft rumors for offensive purposes. 
In March 1990, the Department of Defense published the Psychological 
Operations Master Plan, which outlined the overhaul of psychological operations 
                                                 
22 Office of Strategic Services, Morale Operations Field Manual No 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1943). 
23 Office of Strategic Studies Planning Group, Doctrine Re Rumors (Washington, DC: GPO, 1943), 
16. 
24 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 33-5: Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1966); U.S. Department of the Army, FM 33-1: Psychological Operations, 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1979), 2–16; U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-53 Military Information 
Support Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), 4–19; U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-05.302: 
Tactical Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005); 
U.S. Department of the Army, STP 33-37F14-SM-TG: Psychological Operations Specialist, Skill Levels 1 
Through 4 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008); U.S. Department of the Army, STP 33-37II-OFS: Officer 
Foundation Standards II, Psychological Operations (37A) Officer’s Manual (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2007); U.S. Department of the Defense, Joint Publications 3-13.2: Psychological Operations (Washington, 
DC: GPO, 2010); U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-05.301: Psychological Operations, Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: GPO, 2003); U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-05.301: 
Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007). 
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doctrine, planning, education and training, and force structure.25 This document was 
intended to modernize capabilities following a prolonged decay dating back to the end of 
the Vietnam War.26 The planning document spurred several changes to doctrine, which 
led to the reincorporation of the basic tenets of rumor theory.27 In particular, the U.S. 
military transposed tenets of rumor theory selectively from the work of Allport and 
Postman, providing a framework to craft, recognize, and counter rumors.28 However, the 
U.S. military abandoned these tenets in current doctrine, although doctrine still expresses 
the need for psychological operations soldiers to be able to counter rumors employed by 
the enemy effectively.29 
D. TYPES OF INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THEIR ASSOCIATION TO 
RUMORS 
This section focuses on several different doctrinal terms and techniques used in 
U.S. military influence operations and examines their applicability to rumors. This 
investigation first requires discussing influence operations as a whole, which is the 
overarching category under which the doctrinal terms of disinformation, misinformation, 
and deception are cached. 
Perspectives differ on the meaning of influence operations, with definitions 
ranging from the spreading of deliberately false information to promulgating information 
based on partial to full-truths to persuade or influence a portion of a population. Despite 
their differences, the varied definitions of influence operations all espouse the  
necessity of influencing an audience as a common purpose; without the ability to 
influence, influence operations would simply entail the aimless sharing of data. 
Therefore, this study will use the following definition of influence operations from FM 
                                                 
25 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Psychological Operations Master Plan, 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), ii–iv. 
26 Ibid., ii.  
27 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 33-1-1: Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 11–4—11–5. 
28 Allport and Postman, “An Analysis of Rumor,” 505.  
29 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-05.30: Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2005), B3. 
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3–05: “Any form of communication in support of . . . objectives designed to influence the 
opinions, emotions, attitudes or behavior, of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, 
either directly or indirectly.”30 Defining influence operations in this way allows the study 
to look at several different types of propaganda, running the gamut of complete truth to 
complete fabrications. 
Influence operations are characteristically classified as belonging to one of three 
categories: white, gray, or black. White influence operations messages are circulated 
under the endorsement, or in the very least, with the acknowledgment of the originating 
source. They are also factually based, which helps to build the credibility of the 
originator. When influence operations cannot easily be tied to the originator, or the 
message’s truthfulness is uncertain, it is classified as gray. Influence operations are 
classified as black when the message is tied to someone besides the originator, and the 
message may contain false information. Proving the source and accuracy of black 
influence operations is quite difficult, which makes them ideal for the potential 
employment of rumors. Thus rumors, due to their obscure origins, are oftentimes either 
classified as gray or black forms of influence categorically. 
Disinformation is a unique subset of influence operations designed to distort 
information and deceive an adversary.31 This type of influence operation is accomplished 
by disseminating false information through clandestine channels, using direct or indirect 
methods to influence or deceive an opponent’s forces, individuals, or leaders.32 The key 
element to disinformation is the employment of false, or partly false, information. 
Rumors can be used as a type of disinformation because they are sometimes disseminated 
via clandestine channels and can use some type of false, slanted, or suggestive 
information to persuade an audience. 
                                                 
30 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.302: Tactical Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, 
and Procedures, D–1.  




Disinformation is commonly conflated with misinformation. Misinformation is 
the unintentional release of false information. Therefore, unlike a disinformation 
operation, misinformation is accidental and, therefore, is not a viable subset of effective 
influence operations. Although the information shared in some rumors may appear to be 
the result of an unintended leak, it is not actually the case. Making information appear as 
though it were unintentionally released is a means to mask the true source of the rumor, 
or to give it greater appeal; rumors are always thoroughly planned, and therefore, cannot 
be defined as a form of misinformation. 
Military deception (MILDEC) often incorporates rumors as a part of its overall 
plan. Joint Publications 3–13.4 Military Deception defines MILDEC “as those actions 
executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military 
capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific 
actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly 
mission.”33  Essential to this definition is that MILDEC is planned to influence the 
decision makers of an adversary to gain a marked advantage. To do so, MILDEC uses 
many different techniques or approaches, such as “surprise, stealth, misinformation, 
disinformation, [and] false moves.”34 
Rumors are periodically employed as part of an overall MILDEC plan and, are 
used to reinforce a decision maker’s perceptions. For example, as part of Nazi Germany’s 
MILDEC plan supporting Operation Barbarossa—Germany’s invasion of Russia on June 
22, 1941—the Germans sought to mask their massing of troops and equipment on 
Russia’s border. To deceive Joseph Stalin of its true intentions, Germany displayed 
indicators that its forces would be conducting an invasion of Great Britain instead—code-
named Operation Sea Lion—as a cover for their preparations against Russia. In support 
of this deception, the Germans circulated rumors among their civilian and military 
populations to convince these audiences that such an invasion of Great Britain was 
indeed forthcoming. 
                                                 
33 Department of Defense, Joint Publication: 3-13.4: Military Deception (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2006), I-1. 
34 James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi, Deception Explained, Described, and Revealed, Victory and 
Deceit: Dirty Tricks in War (New York: W. Morrow, 1995), 3.  
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These rumors were critical to the establishment of Germany’s cover story, with 
German leaders first needing to deceive their own population to mislead Soviet 
intelligence agents who would draw on such rumors from the wider German 
population.35 This information was then, in turn, relayed to the Soviet high command, 
which briefed Joseph Stalin as the key Soviet decision maker. Rumors circulated, such as 
Stalin’s upcoming visit to the southern German city of Baden-Baden, and restrictions on 
civilian passenger trains going toward the West convinced Germans to believe that 
relations between the Soviets and Germans were still intact, and that a future attack on 
Britain was imminent.36 The Soviet intelligence apparatus used the information gleaned 
from these rumors to validate and reinforce other pieces of intelligence which, taken 
together, indicated that the Germans did not intend to break the Russo-German pact by 
launching an assault on the Soviet Union. 
The example of Germany’s preparation for Operation Barbarossa illustrates the 
utility of rumors when employed as part of a MILDEC plan; however rumors have a 
wider applicability than simply being a technique in support of MILDEC. As is 
demonstrated in subsequent chapters through case study analysis, rumors can also be 
used by a military organization as an end unto themselves, rather than solely being a 
means to an end. Such a demonstration forces one to consider the broader applicability of 
rumors. Rumors are an influence conduit that can be tailored to create and reinforce 
perceptions, as well as to channel the hopes and fears of a population. 
E. RUMORS AND INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES 
Influence operations can only effectively persuade a target audience by using 
techniques that frame the argument in a manner that motivates an audience toward a 
particular behavior. In his article, “Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, 
and Terror,” Kenneth Payne states, “the successful propagandist has grounded their 
                                                 
35 Russel H. S. Stolfi, “Barbarossa: German Grand Deception and the Achievement of Strategic and 
Tactical Surprise against the Soviet Union, 1940–1941,” in Strategic Military Deception, ed. Donald C. 
Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 200–203. 
36 Ibid., 204. 
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message in the narrative elements most likely to resonate with the target groups.”37 
Current doctrine describes 15 different techniques that present information in a  
manner that will increase the information’s appeal, credibility, and ability to influence a 
target audience. Presented in Figure 1, the 15 techniques are: glittering generalities, 
transference, least of evils, name-calling, plain folks or common man, testimonials, 
insinuation, presenting the other side, simplification, compare and contrast, compare for 
similarities, illustrations and narratives, specific instances, statistics, and explanations.38 
Figure 1.  Influence Techniques Found in Current U.S. Military Doctrine 
 
Source: U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3–05.301: Psychological Operations, Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, DC: GPO, 2003), 5–11. 
                                                 
37 Kenneth Payne, “Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda, Ideology, and Terror,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 32, no. 2 (2009): 110. 
38 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.301, 5–11. 
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These techniques appear in both historical and current influence campaigns, 
validating their applicability, timelessness, and effectiveness. Traditional influence 
media, such as leaflets, posters, and handbills, only utilize one or two of these techniques 
to convey a message; however, rumors, as a medium, can incorporate a multitude of these 
techniques, which helps to increase the appeal of the message to a wider audience. 
As an example of this phenomenon, consider a rumor in circulation at a work 
place that says that the company is going to cut costs over the next six months. To some, 
this rumor would insinuate that the company would be forced to downsize its labor pool. 
For others, this rumor would create or reinforce a simplification of good versus evil, 
whereby the company is either cutting costs to save workers jobs, or the company is 
attempting to increase profits. Yet, for others, this rumor conjures a compare and contrast 
scenario, suggesting that the company is being forced to cut costs to save the business 
and, by extension, the majority of its employees’ livelihoods. While this hypothetical 
example shows how rumors can incorporate many different influence techniques based 
on individual and group perceptions, it also highlights the flexibility of rumors as an 
approach to influence. This example further demonstrates that a rumor instigator needs to 
craft messages in a specific manner to limit the rumor’s potential for misinterpretation by 
both the primary and secondary audiences, as is further described in the next section. 
F. PRINCIPLES FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF RUMORS 
Drawing from the OSS manual on rumors, an effective rumor “is a simple, brief, 
concrete and vivid story, purporting to come from inside sources, concerning persons and 
events familiar to all members of a group,” which “provides justification for emotions” 
and “serves to fill a knowledge gap.”39 An effective rumor is highly self-propelling and 
resistant to distortion during its transmission. The OSS manual further asserts that all 
effective rumors share the following characteristics: they are easy to remember; they are 
based on current interests and circumstances; they exploit emotions and sentiments; and 
they follow historical precedents.40 The ineffective rumor can, therefore, be conversely 
                                                 
39 Office of Strategic Studies Planning Group, “Doctrine Re Rumors,” 2.  
40 Ibid., 1. 
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characterized as being overly complicated, unrelated to the current concerns of its 
audience, dispassionate and unconnected to historical stereotypes. 
The OSS manual further asserts that the crafting and employment of effective 
rumors is more of an art than a science.41 Akin to the novelist, the rumor instigator must 
have a knack for producing a story that captures the imagination of his audience. This 
reliance on creativity and judgment of the individual limits the usefulness of a set of 
prescriptive rules to follow when developing a rumor. However, by analyzing examples 
of effective rumors, a collection of “tentative criteria” can be extracted to help guide the 
appraisal of a rumor during its crafting (Figure 2).42 
Figure 2.  OSS Principles for the Employment of Rumors 
 
Source: Office of Strategic Studies Planning Group, Doctrine Re Rumors (Washington, 
DC: GPO, 1943). 
                                                 
41 Office of Strategic Studies Planning Group, “Doctrine Re Rumors,” 1. 
42 Ibid., 9.  
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The first criterion of an effective rumor is plausibility. Plausibility is enhanced by 
the conveyance of seemingly concrete evidence. Referencing specific persons, places, 
and things reduces the overall ambiguity of the message and allows individuals to receive 
new information more readily. A lack of explicit detail encourages individuals to ask 
questions, seeking more information before they are willing to pass the message along to 
others; after all, an individual’s reputation for “honesty, knowledge, and sound judgment” 
is either increased or decreased by the information shared with others.43 An individual is 
rewarded with increased trust and prestige from his peers for sharing reliable information, 
which fills a knowledge gap, while sharing unreliable information yields opposite results. 
Renowned sociologist, Tamotsu Shibutani, also observes that “whenever men become 
conscious of the possibility of being duped, they take special precautions to defend 
themselves against suggestibility . . . sometimes they become hypercritical, overly 
careful,” and become wholly unwilling to accept and share any information that is 
potentially faulty, as the conveyance of such information may damage their reputation.44 
Incorporating the expectations of the target audience into the crafting of the rumor 
enhances its plausibility. Shibutani further contends that rumors gain traction when “they 
fit with, and support, the prior convictions of those who accept them.”45 People naturally 
seek information that confirms, rather than conflicts, with their views of the world, a 
phenomenon called confirmation bias. If a rumor conforms to what its audience is already 
conditioned to believe, the audience will more readily accept the new information.46 
When presented with “information that’s consistent with [their] existing beliefs,” people 
are quick to accept such information at face value; “information that contradicts [their] 
beliefs is often ignored or critically scrutinized and discounted.”47 However, if the new 
information provided in the rumor is a falsehood, it should not be easily verifiable. If the 
                                                 
43 Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1966), 23.  
44 Ibid., 127. 
45 Sunstein, On Rumors, 6. 
46 Laura Gordon-Murnane, “Political Misinformation,” in Web of Deceit: Misinformation and 
Manipulation in the Age of Social Media, ed. Ann P. Mintz (Medford, NJ: Information Today, 2012), 114. 
47 Thomas E. Kida, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: The 6 Basic Mistakes We Make in Thinking 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006), 156.  
 19
new information cannot be easily verified, and if it cannot be easily denied, the 
information will more likely survive screening by its audience. 
Furthermore, the plausibility of a rumor is enhanced if it is given the appearance 
of being inside information “which has leaked from an authoritative source.”48 The 
authoritative source need not be known, a fictitious character would suffice, so long as 
the character is attributed with unique access to the information. Knapp argues that the 
purpose of attributing the information to a “high authoritative source” is that it gives “the 
rumor both prestige and the appearance of veracity,” which are essential to convince 
others to share the information.49 
The plausibility of a rumor can also be enhanced by limiting the exaggeration of 
the rumor’s supposed facts. As Allport and Postman argue, the main motive for 
circulating rumors is to “find a plausible reason for a confused situation;”50 in other 
words, the rumor has to satisfy the demands of the inquiring audience ably with an 
explanation that is logical. For a rumor to propagate, therefore, it must masquerade as the 
truth; something that is too fantastic to believe will be dismissed out of hand by members 
of its target audience. 
The second criterion is simplicity. A simple story is easier to remember and is 
thus easier to pass along. The addition of unnecessary supplementary information only 
increases the likelihood that key components of the rumor will be excluded. Furthermore, 
rumors that are too complex may end up confusing the target audience and, in turn, the 
audience may misconstrue the message as it is passed along. During its propagation, the 
rumor will likely undergo modification by members of its target audience, making the 
rumor more complex than originally intended; it therefore makes little sense to 
overburden the rumor with unnecessary details at its inception. 
The third criterion is suitability. A rumor is suitable when it is designed to achieve 
the objective for which it was created; in other words, the rumor should be fashioned to 
                                                 
48 Office of Strategic Studies Planning Group, “Doctrine Re Rumors,” 10.  
49 Knapp, “A Psychology of Rumor,” 29. 
50 Allport and Postman, “An Analysis of Rumor,” 503. 
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fulfill its purpose. Suitability is a function of the audience’s familiarity with, and 
disposition toward, the information being presented in the rumor. For example, the OSS 
manual contends that a rumor intended to enflame the passions of its target audience “can 
be short and uncomplicated by qualifications and complexities of plot.”51 By contrast, a 
rumor intended to “suggest new attitudes should be embedded in an interesting narrative 
allowing room for development of details and some complexity of plot.”52 
The fourth criterion is vividness. Vividness refers to the qualities of the rumor that 
make it interesting and worthy of sharing. The OSS manual asserts that rumors that have 
“strong emotional content,” and which are entertaining, “are likely to be most 
effective.”53 Personal stories shared between individuals are more engaging and more 
credible than impersonal scientific evidence because a personal story can be emotionally 
charged.54 Sunstein summarizes, “When rumors produce strong emotions—disgust, 
anger, outrage—people are far more likely to spread them.”55 Knowledge of what the 
target audience finds to be most emotionally provocative is crucial to satisfy this 
criterion; the rumor instigator must understand the audience’s psyche so that the rumor is 
designed to play effectively on the fears and hopes of that audience. 
The fifth and final criterion of an effective rumor is suggestiveness. Although 
appearing to be at odds with the first criterion of plausibility, the two need not be 
mutually exclusive. Suggestiveness offers that, in some instances, a rumor is more 
effective when its content or conclusion is left open for interpretation by the audience. 
Suggestiveness is particularly useful when attempting to spread fear and doubt among a 
population.56 Individuals who are allowed to figure out the hidden meanings of messages 
or to draw their own conclusions based upon scantly provided information are more 
                                                 
51 Office of Strategic Studies Planning Group, “Doctrine Re Rumors,” 3.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Kida, Don’t Believe Everything You Think, 37.  
55 Sunstein, On Rumors, 59.  
56 Office of Strategic Studies Planning Group, “Doctrine Re Rumors,” 11.  
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likely to internalize the message, and are more willing to pass along such self-made 
revelations to their peers. 
G. PRINCIPLES FOR THE DEFENSE AGAINST RUMORS 
A fundamental truth of military tactics is that the side on the offense gains the 
advantage of the initiative and is able to strike the enemy at a time and place of their 
choosing. The defender can, and should, prepare as strong a position as possible to 
prevent or reduce the impact of the attack; however, even the strongest defense has 
vulnerabilities, which the attacker will seek to exploit. Once committed, the defender is 
challenged to neutralize the attack, awaiting an opportunity to wrest the initiative away 
by conducting a counteroffensive. 
The commander and his staff should prepare as strong a defense as possible 
against the employment of rumors by the enemy; however, even the strongest defense 
will not prevent the circulation of all rumors. An adversary employing rumors against an 
opponent maintains the initiative and is able to assess vulnerabilities of their target, is 
capable of determining the most advantageous time to initiate a rumor, and can craft a 
rumor that will have the greatest possible impact. Acknowledging that a strong defense 
cannot prevent all attacks, once a potentially harmful rumor has been identified, the 
commander and his staff must then take steps to neutralize the effects of that rumor. 
Strategies for how a military organization should defend against rumors, 
including both preventing the employment of rumors and neutralizing their effect if 
employed, cannot be found in current doctrine or training of the U.S. military. However, 
principles of defense against rumors can be gleaned from the business sector, where firms 
are frequently faced with the challenge of combating rumors employed against their 
organizations by outside entities. Andrew Hiles, a consultant for reputation and risk 
management, has compiled a set of guidelines for rumor defense in the business world, 
which includes the following: being prepared to deal with the circulation of rumors; 
taking prompt action against rumors once they emerge; staying on message and 
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controlling the narrative; minimizing misunderstanding when refuting rumors; and taking 
responsibility when the rumors are actually the unacknowledged truth.57 
From these overarching guidelines, Bordia, Difonzo, and Rosnow distill a set of 
criteria for the prevention and neutralization of rumors levied against a business by 
exterior agents.58 To prevent rumors from circulating, the criteria require the reduction of 
environmental anxiety and uncertainty, and limiting the means of rumor dissemination. 
To neutralize rumors in circulation, the criteria advocate ignoring impotent rumors, 
commenting on plausible rumors, confirming the truth, and refuting falsehoods 
effectively. These criteria, depicted in Figure 3, can be adapted by a military organization 
to build a defense against an adversary’s employment of rumors. 
Figure 3.  Principles for the Defense against Rumors 
 
Source: Andrew Hiles, “How Firms Should Fight Rumors,” in Reputation Management: 
Building and Protecting Your Company’s Profile in a Digital World, ed. Andrew Hiles 
(London: A&C Black, 2011). 
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2011), 6. 
58 Prashant Bordia, Nicholas Difonzo, and Ralph Rosnow, “Reigning in Rumors,” Organizational 
Dynamics 23, no. 1 (1994): 56. 
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Preparing a defense, which prevents the employment of rumors against an 
organization, involves efforts to reduce the likelihood that rumors will be generated in the 
first place.59 Bordia, Difonzo, and Rosnow contend that an organization seeking to 
prevent the generation of rumors can do so “by reducing the conditions (uncertainty and 
anxiety) that make people susceptible to them.”60 Bordia, Difonzo, and Rosnow further 
assert that steps taken to reduce uncertainty and anxiety include the explanation of 
otherwise unexplained events; acting transparently, ethically, and responsibly with the 
public; and making efforts to anticipate rumors with the intent of avoiding the generation 
of “uncertainty or anxiety-producing events.”61 Additionally, an organization can prevent 
the employment of rumors by limiting an adversary’s means to disseminate its message 
by eliminating known sources of damaging rumors—key individuals or groups—and by 
restricting channels or mediums that have previously facilitated the propagation of 
rumors.  
An organization will not be able to inhibit the circulation of all rumors; therefore, 
the commander and his staff should be prepared to neutralize the effects of rumors that 
gain traction with the public. To neutralize the effects of rumors employed against it, an 
organization should commit to the following: to ignore rumors that are judged to be 
impotent, comment on inquiries to plausible rumors, confirm the truth, and refute rumors 
effectively.62 
Being able to discern which rumors have the potential to gain mass appeal and 
which are likely to self-terminate is an essential part of the organization’s defense against 
rumors. Ignoring rumors that are too implausible to gain significant traction on their own 
is often a better strategy than acknowledging them. By repeating or acknowledging a 
preposterous rumor, an organization may actually give the rumor an undue amount of 
credibility, furthering its longevity and appeal.63 
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However, it is imperative to comment on believable rumors. Commenting on 
plausible rumors is a better course of action than ignoring inquiries about them 
altogether. Intentionally ignoring an inquiry about a plausible rumor creates an 
unintended response to the question; it indicates that there might be something to hide. 
Bordia, Difonzo, and Rosnow claim that no response “will most likely give more 
credence to the rumor” than it had in the first place.64 
As “rumors often contain a grain of truth,” Bordiam, Difonzo, and Rosnow argue 
that an effective way of neutralizing a rumor “is to confirm the part that is true.”65 
Confirming the truth, while denying falsehoods associated with a rumor, will aid in 
building an organization’s reputation for transparency, and will foster a trusting 
relationship with the public. It will also prevent an adversary from building more 
falsehoods on top of the truth with subsequent rumors. 
Rumors that are the most plausible and able to inflict the most damage to an 
organization require an effective refutation. Any refutation should be based on truth, 
rather than falsehoods, as the response given by an organization is sure to undergo 
scrutiny by the public; a discovery of dishonesty in the response would be doubly 
damaging. 
The spokesperson for the organization needs to be perceived as credible for 
rumors to be successfully refuted. Credibility is an attribute ascribed to the spokesperson 
by the public; it must be cultivated rather than demanded. As Kouzes and Posner argue, 
“credibility, like reputation, is something that is earned over time,”66 it is not 
automatically given to a person. Credibility is a function of both objective and subjective 
components. Objective components include a person’s rank or position, established 
reliability based upon precedent, and their professional expertise. Subjective components 
of credibility are based upon a person’s charisma, their physical appearance and personal 
characteristics. Individuals who are perceived as credible are often characterized as being 
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honest, visionary, inspirational, competent, and adaptive to their environment.67 
Therefore, to speak with authority on the organization’s behalf successfully, the 
spokesperson for the organization should carry sufficient rank, should possess recognized 
professional knowledge, and should have established rapport with the public. 
The refutation provided needs to be concise and easy to understand, as Bordia and 
Difonzo note, “denials that are lengthy, vague, and verbose are unconvincing and sound 
like a cover-up.”68 Refutations should be provided in an open forum, allowing the 
organization’s spokesperson and the public to participate in an open dialogue to dispel 
uncertainty and to build trust. Finally, if the organization is unable to refute a rumor on its 
own effectively, it should consider using a trustworthy authority from outside the 
organization to speak on its behalf; in other words, it should outsource the credibility. 
H. IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY FOR RUMOR EFFECTIVENESS 
Rumors were traditionally thought to be a phenomenon spread only by word of 
mouth, evoking the image of a literal whisper campaign. However, the means by which 
rumors spread has evolved with advances in technology.69 Today, rumors can spread as a 
result of viewing suggestive print media, radio broadcasts, intercepted phone 
conversations, television broadcasts, or information received from various social media 
outlets on the Internet (blogs, picture-sharing, video logs, wall postings, email, instant 
messenger services, etc.).70 Anthropologist Nils Bubant argues that it is the 
“intermodality of rumor, its ability to piggyback on and intersect with other media, 
printed and electronic, legitimate and illegitimate . . . [which] gives it reach and 
impact.”71 
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Furthermore, Bordia and Difonzo argue that the means by which a rumor spreads 
has an impact on its overall effectiveness, given that “a rumor’s influence is dependent on 
how extensively it has dispersed.”72 Technology’s effect on the information age has 
implications for the speed at which a rumor travels, the reach a rumor has across social 
networks, and for masking the identity of its source. Specializing in the research of online 
ethics, Anne Mintz points out that the bending of truth—telling lies and spreading 
rumors—is not something new, “it’s just the messenger who has changed, and this 
messenger spreads the word lightning fast and to far-flung places.”73 
The advent of the Internet, with its capacity for spreading information at minimal 
cost, has increased the capability of a rumor to influence a population. As a 
communication tool, the Internet has revolutionized the way in which information is 
organized and shared within and across populations. As Fischer contends, the Internet has 
the ability to “bring together social networks of concerned individuals both within a 
community and throughout a larger international or even virtual community” in ways 
never before imagined.74 
Social impact theory suggests a plausible reason why rumors would have more 
impact once diffused across a virtual community. As Latané observes, rumors occur in 
social space configurations, which are patterns of relationship between people.75 Latané 
explains: “Social space configurations are important because they directly affect 
immediacy and numbers of influence sources, two key social impact factors.”76 The 
Internet decreases the social space between the nodes of a network connected by hubs, 
which would otherwise exist in isolation from one another, significantly increasing the 
immediacy and number of nodes with access to a rumor. Given this lack of isolation, 
Bordia and Difonzo assert that rumors on the Internet “quickly make their way to hubs 
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who then broadcast them widely,” effectively spreading the rumor across several nodes, 
“rapidly saturating the network.”77 
As a form of casual communication, rumors are ideally suited to spread by way of 
the Internet, because, as a medium for communication, the Internet offers an “inherently 
informal structure,” for which “it is impossible to both limit who posts information . . . 
and to validate much of the information appearing there.”78 Furthermore, the Internet has 
loosened the control of journalism by creating new methods for accessing information, 
while at the same time allowing more people the ability to generate content for public 
consumption. Seib points out that this loosening of control by traditional sources, and the 
public’s subsequent reliance on nontraditional sources for information, has weakened 
responsible practices of journalism in favor of speed and sensationalism, over a more 
methodical process yielding greater accuracy.79 
Cyber-journalism has resulted in a significant increase in content available to the 
public; a glut of information can overwhelm the capacity of its audience to validate such 
information before being bombarded with new information. Furthermore, information on 
the Internet is taken at face value if it is already aligned with a person’s preconceptions. 
In other instances, Davis notes that information that would otherwise be considered too 
incredible, gains “legitimacy by virtue of its widespread dissemination and constant 
repetition.”80 Similarly, Sunstein argues that the Internet increases the believability of 
information simply because the Internet allows for the repeated viewing, sharing, and 
confirmation of information from multiple sources (sometimes in a circular fashion).81 
According to Sunstein, “as more people defer, thus making the crowd grow, there is a 
real risk that large groups of people will believe rumors even though they are entirely 
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false.”82 Moreover, even if only a portion of the antecedent rumor were accepted as truth 
by the individual, any information received thereafter would be compared against, or 
built upon, the previous fabrication, as “first impressions tend to persist, even when the 
initial evidence on which these impressions were based is discredited.”83 
I. CONCLUSION 
This chapter began with a review of the significant academic literature on the 
social phenomenon of rumor, and provided a brief overview of U.S. military influence 
doctrine, beginning with the earliest publications on the subject by the OSS during World 
War II, and ending with doctrine currently in circulation. It emphasized a gap in current 
U.S. military doctrine regarding how rumors are generated and spread for the purpose of 
either effectively employing or defending against them. 
Two sets of principles based on the tenets of rumor theory also provided 
important insights. The first set of principles demonstrated that successful rumors are 
characteristically uncomplicated and easy to remember, they are based on the current 
interests and circumstances of their audience, they exploit emotions and sentiments, and 
they follow historical precedents. Successful rumors also require the satisfaction of  
five criteria: plausibility, simplicity, suitability, vividness, and—in some cases—
suggestiveness. 
The second set of principles, relating to the defense against rumors, demonstrated 
the need for being prepared to deal with rumors, taking prompt action once rumors 
emerge, staying on message when refuting rumors, controlling the narrative, minimizing 
misunderstanding when refuting rumors, and taking responsibility for the truthful 
elements of any rumor. The prevention of rumors requires a reduction of environmental 
anxiety and ambiguity, while limiting an adversary’s means to disseminate rumors. The 
neutralization of rumors requires ignoring those that are impotent, commenting on those 
that are plausible, confirming the truth, and refuting falsehoods effectively. 
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Finally, the chapter addressed how technological advances, particularly the 
Internet, have changed the propagation and effectiveness of rumors, including the speed 
of information and the ability of anyone to report information and spread rumors as 
factors that increase the likelihood that false information will be circulated, accepted as 
truth, and built upon. 
The next chapter uses these insights to analyze three cases in which rumors were 
utilized effectively, noting the presence or absence of the principles for rumor 
employment purported in this chapter. 
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III. TESTING THE PRINCIPLES OF RUMOR EMPLOYMENT: 
EFFECTIVE RUMORS FROM WWII TO  
THE INFORMATION AGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II offered a working definition of successful rumors, proposing that they 
are highly self-propelling and resistant to distortion during transmission, are 
characteristically easy to remember, uncomplicated in detail, based on current interests, 
exploiting emotion and sentiments, and following historical precedents. From these 
characteristics, the previous chapter proposed a set of required criteria for the effective 
employment of rumors: plausibility, simplicity, suitability, vividness, and suggestiveness. 
This chapter analyzes three cases of successful rumor employment to test the 
proposed criteria: the British use of rumors to discourage an attempt at invasion by Nazi 
Germany during WWII; the use of rumors to advance the theory of a Zionist connection 
to the September 11 attacks; and the Indonesian government’s use of a rumor to 
posthumously denounce a terrorist leader. Each case is first described in detail to provide 
context for discussion, followed by an observation of each criterion. Additionally, the 
effect of technology on a rumor’s propagation is also accounted for where applicable. 
These case studies reveal that the criteria for the effective employment of rumors 
must be satisfied if a rumor is to propagate successfully; these case studies also 
demonstrate the crucial role of technology in amplifying the reach and impact of rumors. 
The cases suggest that where the proposed criteria are not satisfied, or where the criteria 
conflict, a rumor will not become self-propelling or will become unrecognizably distorted 
from its original form; thus, failing to propagate effectively and influence the intended 
target audience. 
B. IN THE DEFENSE OF BRITAIN 
After the British defeat in the 1940 Battle of France and evacuation from Dunkirk, 
they began to craft and circulate numerous rumors to boost morale among their forces 
while, at the same time, attempting to instill fear into the German units training for the 
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invasion of Great Britain. The rumors varied from Britain having placed an order with the 
Australian government for 27 sharks that might be released into the English Channel, to 
the development of new and markedly advanced Allied weaponry.84 This section focuses 
on one of the most widely circulated and best-documented rumors of the period, the 
British incendiary weapon rumor. 
The incendiary weapon rumor—that suggested that the British could set the 
English Channel ablaze to thwart an invasion attempt—was the brainchild of a British 
propagandist named John Baker White. White’s inspiration for the rumor came from a 
demonstration held on the shores of St. Margaret’s-at-Cliffe in Southeastern Britain.85 
Here, the British assembled an improvised irrigation system that pumped a combustible 
mixture from supply tanks to sprinkler-like devices.86 Once dispersed on the beach and 
ignited, the burning substance continued its spread down to the waterline before 
extinguishment.87 The burning beach concept was short-lived, because it became 
apparent that the apparatus was unlikely to survive the enemy’s pre-invasion 
bombardment.88 However, White investigated the possibility of setting the sea itself on 
fire. British experts deemed the endeavor plausible, but determined that it would need an 
extravagant system that would be too costly to construct.89 Nevertheless, because the 
concept was still plausible, White believed that such an idea would be the excellent basis 
for a rumor. 
White, a member of the British Underground Propaganda Committee (UPC), 
along with his colleagues, developed and submitted the draft rumor for approval on 
September 27, 1940.90 The UPC was part of a secret organization called Department 
Electra House, which conducted subversion and psychological warfare on behalf of the 
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British government.91 The following extract from an UPC memo describes the rumor in 
more detail. 
The British have a new weapon. It is a mine to be dropped from aircraft. 
In distinction from other mines, however, it does not explode, but spreads 
a very thin film of highly inflammable and volatile liquid over the surface 
of the water for an enormous area. The mine’s further action then ignites 
this liquid provoking a terrible flame.92 
After British authorities reviewed and approved the idea, the UPC immediately 
implemented the rumor with wide dissemination across occupied Europe through various 
channels. 
Initially, the UPC received very little feedback on the spread of the rumor. As 
several weeks went by, all intelligence gathered from neutral capitals, prisoners or war, 
and other channels showed no mention of the rumor.93 Then, the UPC received accounts 
from two downed German pilots, each from different squadrons, who confirmed that the 
rumor was common knowledge among Luftwaffe aviators.94 Later, a Royal Air Force 
(RAF) airstrike helped give further credibility to the rumor. While conducting a routine 
attack on German invasion barges operating in the French harbor of Calais, the RAF 
inadvertently strengthened the rumor by striking a German infantry battalion with 
incendiary bombs while they rehearsed a cross-Channel invasion.95 Following the attack, 
the burned German soldiers were transferred to medical facilities in Paris, where the 
rumor was already in circulation.96 The population perceived the injured soldiers as 
evidence that the British did in fact have a new weapon that could light the sea on fire. 
The rumor, supported by this unrelated event, increased the morale of the occupied 
Parisians. In his memoirs, White recounted that, “the French, who had not lost their sense 
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of humor, would pretend to warm their hands at Germans sitting next to them in cafés 
and restaurants.”97 
After this feedback, the British continued to reinforce the rumor. For example, the 
British political warfare branch developed replicas of German travel tickets used on 
leave, and disseminated them by air over the occupied territories.98 The leaflets were 
nearly identical to the original leave passes in font, color, and style, making them an 
inviting discovery for the common German soldier. However, the British made several 
modifications to the original leave forms with the aim of reinforcing the incendiary 
weapon rumor. For instance, they replaced the Return Journey header with a One-Way 
Only header, while substituting the Destination of Germany with Britain.99 Additionally, 
the British modified the bodies of the leaflets to describe vividly what the German 
soldiers should expect during their journey with a narration that “promised not the Mosel 
wine and other pleasures of leave, but a reception of burning seas and steam baths.”100 
Although it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of the leaflet, it aimed to reinforce 
the incendiary weapon rumor, and most likely, forced the Germans to ponder the effects 
that British incendiary weapons could have against an invading force. 
Besides the use of leaflets and the fortuitous evidence provided by the RAF 
bombing, radio broadcasts also reinforced the rumor. Sefton Delmer, a British journalist 
turned propagandist during the war, recounts in his autobiography that on July 16, 1940, 
he directly promoted the incendiary weapon rumor during a BBC radio broadcast. Delmer 
describes having provided German listeners with a handy English lesson to assist them 
during the invasion: “for your first lesson we will take: Die Kanalüberfahrt . . . the 
Channel crossing, the Channel crossing.”101 Sefton then discussed how to say the boat is 
sinking in English, and provided the Germans a critical verb to conjugate: brennen (to 
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burn).102 Although radio broadcasts were not used during the rumor’s initial 
dissemination, Sefton’s account demonstrates how technology was used to help reinforce 
the rumor. 
As the rumor of the incendiary weapon continued to permeate the German ranks, 
its military command was forced to recognize the British weapon as a possible threat to a 
cross-Channel invasion. Germans began to experiment with potential countermeasures to 
such a weapon in the small harbor city of Fécamp, located Northeast of Caen.103 Here, 
the Germans “armored a barge with asbestos sheets which they filled with troops and 
steered into a pool of burning gasoline,” to the effect that “all on board were burned to 
death.”104 The Germans were unable to recover all the burnt bodies, after which some 
eventually floated ashore along the northern coast of France.105 This botched attempt to 
produce a countermeasure was doubly damning, as the Germans still failed to find a 
solution to neutralize the new threat posed by this British weapon, while subsequently 
helping to validate the rumor by demonstrating its potential effectiveness to the German 
soldier and civilian populations of occupied Europe. 
Building off the criteria of successful rumors developed in Chapter II, this rumor 
is evaluated on the following five criteria: plausibility, simplicity, suitability, vividness, 
and suggestiveness. 
1. Plausibility 
The UPC crafted the incendiary weapon rumor with plausibility in mind. At the 
rumor’s genesis, White believed that the common German soldier had very little 
experience on the ocean; thus, a potential cross-Channel voyage would naturally generate 
extreme anxiety in the German ranks.106 Such a lack of knowledge, and the 
accompanying fear and anxiety, created the need for German soldiers to gain information 
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regarding expected likely conditions during the invasion. The British incendiary weapon 
rumor helped fill this information gap, which the Germans more readily received due to 
their increased anxiety.107 White also examined historical cases of other seaborne 
invasion attempts and found that a preponderance of such accounts recalled the use of 
incendiary weapons by the defender. For example, incendiary weapons were used during 
the Crusades, from the employment of fire-ships by Sir Francis Drake against the Spanish 
Armada, to the flamethrower first introduced during World War I.108 Furthermore, White 
found that incendiary weapons were often employed because of their tangible 
effectiveness as well as the psychological impact they had on a military force.109 The 
British development of such a weapon, therefore, seemed to fit the logical evolution of 
and employment of incendiary weapons that could not be easily dismissed. 
2. Simplicity 
The UPC also followed the characteristic of simplicity in constructing their 
rumor. The original rumor contained little supplementary information about the new 
incendiary weapon: omitting specific information about the weapon’s effectiveness and 
technical data, such as how much surface area the flames would cover. It was not 
necessary to overburden the rumor with such details; as described in Chapter II, a rumor 
typically evolves as it spreads through a population, with the audience adding its own 
supplementary information. For example, the original incendiary weapon rumor was 
modified and significantly elaborated after having made its way back to Britain, where 
the rumor began to circulate among the British civilian population. Such supplementary 
information included British naval forces having brought ashore German soldiers with 
bandaged hands and faces as a result of burn injuries at the coastal cities of Harwich, 
Newhaven, and Dover.110 
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Another story in circulation included “a convoy of ambulances arriving in the 
dead of night at a hospital outside Norwich, and an “S.O.S.” [being] sent to other 
hospitals in the area for anti-burn dressings.”111 Others alleged to hear of a huge column 
of smoke arising from Sandwich Bay, which supposedly was the secret site used to bury 
the charred bodies of German soldiers.112 Having no factual basis, such elaborations 
added credibility to the original rumor, helping to substantiate the existence of Britain’s 
new weapon. 
3. Suitability 
As noted, the incendiary weapon rumor had two goals from its inception: to 
increase the morale of friendly forces and to sew fear and doubt in the mind of the 
German soldier. The practice of dark-humor related to the incendiary weapon by French 
citizens against German soldiers, specifically French pretending to warm themselves 
from German soldiers, demonstrates the rumor’s ability to bolster morale in occupied 
France. Similarly, the British people experienced an upsurge in boldness as a result of the 
various incendiary weapon rumor derivatives in circulation.  
The rumor was also effective in creating fear among the Germans. The German 
command would not have made efforts to fireproof its invading force had the rumor not 
been effective. Furthermore, White spoke with ex-Wehrmacht officers after the war and 
discovered that, by the middle of 1940, the rumor convinced thousands of Germans along 
the French coast and in the Low Countries that if an invasion attempt on Great Britain 
had been made, a large number of their comrades would have been killed in the flaming 
sea.113 Based on this evidence, the incendiary weapon rumor was appropriately crafted to 
achieve its initial objectives. 
                                                 





The vividness of the incendiary weapon rumor made it exciting and gossip-
worthy. The strong emotional content of the rumor was effective for both British and 
German populations. For the British, the rumor transformed despair into hope following 
the Battle of Dunkirk. The rumor gave the British confidence in their ability to repel a 
German invasion force. For the Germans, the rumor invoked doubt and apprehension; 
such a weapon would cause the Germans to incur significant casualties, possibly denying 
them the ability to conduct a cross-Channel invasion altogether. 
5. Suggestiveness 
As exhibited by various accounts in this section, the rumor’s content and 
conclusion were left open for interpretation. Different target audiences reached different 
conclusions based upon scantly provided information. Suggestiveness, the last of the 
required criteria for a successful rumor, was incorporated and aided the successfulness of 
the rumor by increasing its ability to adapt to changing circumstances and the varied 
demands from its multiple audiences. 
C. ZIONIST PLOTTING OF 9/11  
In the wake of September 11, 2001, the world—particularly the Western world—
was left in a state of shock. The heinous attacks of that day, committed seemingly 
without provocation, magnified an already present state of anxiety, fear, and distrust in 
the world; such conditions helped prompt the development and circulation of several 
rumors as a means to cope with this pronounced feeling of uncertainty. The most 
successful of these rumors was the claim that 4,000 Jewish people failed to report to work 
on September 11; it became known as the Zionist conspiracy rumor. 
The Zionist conspiracy rumor was widely accepted throughout the Middle East as 
a means to explain away the attacks. Reinforced by the presence of already strong anti-
Semitic rhetoric across the region, the Zionist conspiracy rumor had great utility; it 
assigned blame for the attacks to the Jewish people, a common scapegoat, while 
sheltering Arabs from any associated guilt. It was an impressive feat given that all 19 
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hijackers were Arab: 15 were from Saudi Arabia, the remaining four were from the 
United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Lebanon.114 
According to U.S. Department of State research, the Zionist conspiracy rumor can 
be traced to the September 15, 2001, edition of the Syrian government owned newspaper, 
Al Thawra, which first published the claim that 4,000 Jews had been absent from work on 
the day of the attacks, as a result of foreknowledge given to them about the pending 
catastrophes.115 On September 17, al-Manor, a Beirut-based satellite television station 
owned by Hezbollah, communicated the Zionist conspiracy rumor to an international 
audience.116 Al-Manor’s report cited al-Watan, an obscure Jordanian newspaper, as the 
original source of the information; al-Manor also reported that the Jews had received 
hints of the pending attacks from the Israeli Security Agency, commonly known as Shin 
Bet.117 The report further elaborated upon the rumor, going so far as to claim that the 
Israeli secret service, the Mosad, was responsible for the attacks.118 However, 
investigations into these claims yielded no evidence that the al-Watan newspaper was the 
source.119 
While difficult to establish with certainty which publication was the original 
source of the Zionist conspiracy rumor, the rumor’s specific reference to 4,000 Jews 
came from the September 12, 2001, edition of the Jerusalem Post.120 This edition 
included an article entitled “Hundreds of Israelis Missing in WTC Attack,” and stated 
that “the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem has so far received the names of 4,000 Israelis 
believed to have been in the areas of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon at the time 
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of the attacks.”121 While the article noted that as many as 4,000 Jews had possibly been 
affected by the attacks, it made no reference to Jewish people failing to report to work on 
September 11, nor did it indicate that any Jews had foreknowledge of the looming attack. 
The date of publication for the Jerusalem Post article, in relation to the appearance of the 
Zionist conspiracy rumor circulated in other publications, seems to suggest that the 
creators of the rumor had used the Israeli article as the basis for their inspiration. 
As with the British incendiary weapon rumor, the Zionist conspiracy rumor 
received assistance from other substantiating evidence, meant to reinforce its validity; 
however, unlike the evidence presented to support the British rumor, proof for the Zionist 
conspiracy rumor was unsubstantiated at best. One such bit of evidence was found in a 
coded Microsoft Word message, which presumably predicted the attacks and Jewish 
involvement.122 It was revealed that if the characters NYC were typed into Microsoft 
Word under the “Wingdings” font, the characters are represented by . For believers 
of the rumor, the allegedly coded message in Wingdings established a possible mode of 
communication used to disseminate the warning. It also fueled the general conspiracy 
that Israelites played a well-planned part in the attacks since the coding dates back to 
1992.
The Zionist conspiracy rumor has also been included in a variety of anti-Semitic 
literature like that of popular African American civil rights activist, dramatist, novelist, 
and poet, Amiri Baraka. In September 2002, Baraka presented his poem Who Blew Up 
America? at the Geraldine R. DoDge Poetry Festival at Waterloo Village in Stanhope, 
New Jersey.123 In the poem, Baraka directly references and ultimately aids in the rumor’s 
propagation: 
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Who knew the World Trade Center was gonna get bombed?  
Who told 4000 Israeli workers at the Twin Towers  
To stay home that day?  
Why did Sharon124 stay away?125 
Perhaps the most notable reference reinforcing the rumor is found in a 2010 
public address by then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad stated, 
“no ‘Zionists’ were killed in the World Trade Center . . . because ‘one day earlier they 
were told not go to their workplace.’”126 Not only does this demonstrate Ahmadinejad’s 
exploitation of the rumor for political gain by leveraging a prevailing notion of anti-
Semitism across the region, it also illustrates how enduring the Zionist conspiracy rumor 
is, with Ahmadinejad making such a statement nine years after the rumor first began 
circulating. 
Although the Zionist conspiracy rumor has been pervasively propagated 
throughout the world, it is difficult to ascertain the rumor’s actual impact. Nonetheless, a 
few examples provide a glimpse of the rumor’s overall ability to influence. First, a 
number of articles appear on the U.S. Department of State’s website explaining and 
dispelling the rumor’s claim of no Jewish causalities.127 This attempt to correct a 
commonly held, yet faulty belief, has a by-name list with corresponding biographical data 
of 76 Jewish victims of the attacks.128 Another example of the rumor’s impact is evident 
in a 2008 WorldPublicOpinion.org poll, which found that, of 17 nations across the 
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Middle East polled, “majorities in only nine of them believed that al Qaeda was behind 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.”129 
Whereas many factors played a part in crafting these opinions, a distinct 
correlation occurs with the rumor and several countries where the rumor first appeared 
and the persistent belief that Israel played a role in the 9/11 attacks. For example, the 
report states: “in Egypt, 43 percent said that Israel was behind the attacks, as did 
31 percent in Jordan and 19 percent in the Palestinian Territories . . . the numbers who 
said al Qaeda was behind the attacks range from 11 percent in Jordan to 42 percent in the 
Palestinian Territories.”130 Surely such evidence, speculative as it may be, has helped to 
increase the conceivability and shelf life of this rumor, which has now been in circulation 
for fourteen years since its conception. 
Building on the criteria of successful rumors developed in Chapter II, this rumor 
is evaluated on the following five criteria: plausibility, simplicity, suitability, vividness, 
and suggestiveness. 
1. Plausibility 
The Zionist conspiracy rumor incorporated the criterion of plausibility by 
exploiting the prejudices of the target audience toward Israel. In his book, The World 
Through Arab Eyes, polling expert Shibley Telhami discusses why many Arabs hold such 
a perspective. Specifically, Telhami cites impossible victories by Israel over its Arab 
neighbors, including in the 1967 Israeli-Arab War (Six-Day War), as evidence that 
Israel’s power is directly related to Western support.131 Telhami further states, “as the 
twentieth century drew to an end, Arab frustration over Western and Israeli control in the 
region manifested itself in conspiracy theories.”132 Reflected by public polling of the 
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Arab population in the Middle East, such frustration and concern have continued to 
manifest throughout the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
As previously discussed, the Zionist conspiracy rumor was uniquely designed to 
capitalize on this manifestation. Several polls, conducted across the Middle East between 
2005 and 2012, demonstrate the fear held by the Arab respondents for Israel, with Israel 
consistently being characterized as the primary security threat in the region. Such a 
worldview has given the Zionist conspiracy rumor plausibility, with the rumor aligning 
with the preconceptions of the target audience and amplifying the rumor’s effectiveness. 
2. Simplicity 
The Zionist conspiracy rumor was simplistic in its design; it did not provide 
unnecessary supplementary information that could have distracted from the overall 
message of the rumor during propagation. Such simplicity allowed the target audience the 
ability to tailor the basic rumor—modifying and adding relevant details—to meet the 
needs of the environment. For instance, some modifiers of the Zionist conspiracy rumor 
added the notion that the Israeli secret service played a role in planning the attacks; others 
added the idea that the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon received notice of the attacks, 
causing him to cancel his trip to New York; still others claimed that the FBI had arrested 
five Israelis who were caught filming the attacks from the roof of a nearby office 
building.133 Additionally, the simplicity of the rumor made it a prime candidate for 
dissemination via SMS and email; this observation is later elaborated upon in the section 
on the effects of technology. 
3. Suitability 
The Zionist conspiracy rumor achieved and advanced its objectives of creating 
and bolstering anti-Semitism around the world, by exploiting the increased global fear 
and sense of ambiguity as a result of the attacks. The rumor did so primarily by 
confirming the assumptions of the audience for Israel and its intentions, while also 
providing evidence that the United States was deceived. Such a deception inspired hope 
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within the target audience that the cooperative relationship between the United States and 
Israel had been broken and with it a principal source of suffering for the Arab people. 
The Zionist conspiracy rumor also provided critical information for a period of 
time that was fraught with uncertainty; it circulated throughout most of the Arab world 
before state agencies released official reports, which were delayed by data collection and 
fact checking. Since the rumor first offered an explanation for the attacks to the target 
audience, it became difficult for such falsehoods to be corrected, even when presented 
with indisputable evidence to the contrary. Ultimately, it led to the continued acceptance 
and prevalence of the Zionist conspiracy rumor amid certain populations. 
4. Vividness 
The Zionist conspiracy rumor conjured an intense emotional response, based on 
associated prejudices of the target audience toward Israel and its speculation of Israel’s 
intentions for overall control of the Middle East. To some members of the target 
audience, the rumor bolstered their conviction that Israel was the predominate threat to 
Middle Eastern security; while for others, it further validated their vested mistrust of 
Israel. The emotional provocativeness of the Zionist conspiracy rumor matched well with 
the psyche of the target audience, allowing for a passionate commitment to the 
information by the audience, furthering the diffusion of the rumor throughout social 
networks. 
5. Suggestiveness 
The Zionist conspiracy rumor also suggested future catastrophic events taking 
place in the Middle East. For those who believed in the rumor’s authenticity, it suggested 
that their country might undergo attacks similar to those suffered by the United States. 
After all, it was reasonable to believe that if the Israelis would be willing to conduct such 
an attack against the United States, which had long been a great supporter of its security 
and advocate for its international grievances, it would do the same to unfriendly states. 
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6. Effect of Technology 
Modern technology assisted the rapid propagation of the Zionist conspiracy rumor 
across several continents. For example, Bryan Curtis, a former staff writer for Slate.com, 
using Nexis and the Google search engine in October of 2001, conducted a review of the 
rumors origins and transmission via the Internet.134 Curtis found the first publicized 
reference to the rumor had come from al-Manar on September 17, 2001.135 The following 
day, an American website called Information Times, edited by Syad Adeeb, launched an 
article entitled “4,000 Jews Did Not Go to Work at WTC on Sept. 11,” which credited its 
source to an al-Manar special report.136 According to Curtis, “the ‘4,000 Jews’ page 
[was] easily forwarded as e-mail, and this may explain the message’s rapid 
dissemination.”137 Furthermore, while following the Hizbollah satellite news story 
featuring the rumor, Stephan Quinn, a media and communications expert, noted that the 
rumor was quickly picked up and broadcasted by local Arabic radio stations, and that his 
students helped further spread the rumor by way of email and SMS forwarding.138 
Speaking on the Zionist conspiracy rumor, Quinn stated, “it was picked up by English-
language news agencies who reported it as a rumor. But it was re-reported as fact by 
Arabic radio stations who re-translated the story into Arabic and other languages.”139 
Members of the target audience helped to modify the rumor by incorporating new twists 
into the story, and by importing their own perceptions and biases, taking advantage of the 
high frequency of retransmission of the rumor using several different medium types, and 
its movement from one language to another and then back again.140 
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D. DENOUNCING ISLAMIC MARTYR NOORDIN TOP 
Southeast Asia is home to myriad insurgent and terrorist organizations, including 
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Pattani United Liberation Organization, and the 
Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front. However, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Islamic 
Congregation, is arguably the most influential and violent organization in the region. 
Since its inception in the 1970s, JI has grown to include an estimated one thousand 
members and has established itself as a transnational organization, now affiliated with the 
al-Qaeda network.141 In its attempt to usurp governments across the region, JI has 
conducted a series of high profile bombings since 2000, resulting in several hundred 
casualties throughout Southeast Asia.142 “JI has a jihadist vision and wants to establish an 
Islamist state in the region,” according to global terrorism expert Amy Zalman, 
“encompassing Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and 
southern Thailand.”143 
It would be inaccurate, however, to describe JI as a monolithic organization. JI is 
composed of a number of individual factions led by charismatic leaders who pledged 
fealty to the founder of JI, Abu Bakar Bashir.144 One such leader was Noordin 
Mohammed Top, who controlled JI’s most aggressive faction, Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad—
also known as al-Qaeda in the Malay Archipelago.145 Noordin, once considered “the 
most capable and experienced bomber within the broader Jemaah Islamiyah group,”146 is 
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believed to have played a role in every major terror attack in Indonesia over the last 
decade.147 
Originally operating in his native country of Malaysia, Noordin fled to Indonesia 
after the September 11 attacks increased domestic pressure against militants in that 
country. Along with his understanding of explosives, terrorism expert James Hookway 
claims that Noordin brought to Indonesia his talent for persuading “Indonesians to act as 
suicide bombers—something not previously seen in that part of the world.”148 However, 
Noordin’s orchestration of attacks, such as the 2002 bombing of a Bali nightclub, which 
killed 202 people, attracted the attention of the Indonesian authorities and made him the 
premier target of regional security forces. 
Despite dedicating their most competent forces to the capture of Noordin, 
Indonesian authorities were unable to stop the terrorist leader for nearly 10 years. 
Noordin’s ability to continue coordinating large-scale attacks in Indonesia, while 
simultaneously evading the police, earned him a certain celebrity status across Southeast 
Asia. Bernardi asserts that rumors circulated of Noordin’s seemingly supernatural ability 
to escape apprehension, with some casting “him as a satanic figure, others as an Islamic 
savior.”149 Such rumors continued to spread, increasing their reach and impact with each 
successful act of terror, or with each failed attempt by the police to kill or capture 
Noordin. 
On September 17, 2009, acting on a tip from a local informant, members of 
Indonesia’s elite counter terrorism unit, Detachment 88, surrounded a house in central 
Java where Noordin was supposedly residing.150 Detachment 88’s attempts to breach the 
home were met with volleys of gunfire, resulting in a three-hour firefight between the 
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residents and Indonesian security forces.151 The security forces eventually prevailed and 
all in the house were either killed or captured. At a news conference on the same day as 
the raid, Indonesia’s senior police officer, General Bambang Danuri, revealed that one of 
those killed in the final assault had been Noordin Mohammad Top; he was identified 
using visual and fingerprint verification.152 
DNA analysis confirmed the corpse of Noordin two days after the raid, with a 
subsequent forensic examination of the body conducted on September 30. This detailed 
inspection of the cadaver revealed something bewildering to the authorities; according to 
police spokesman Nanan Sukarna, the “forensic investigators had discovered evidence of 
anal trauma consistent with sodomy, a charge that would lead most consumers of this 
information to connect Noordin to homosexuality.”153 The forensics expert who 
conducted the autopsy, Dr. Munim Idris, verified at a press release that there were 
irregularities with Noordin’s corpse; specifically Dr. Idris noted that Noordin had a 
funnel-shaped anus, indicating consistent trauma to the anal cavity as a result of passive 
sodomy.154 What Dr. Idris failed to mention was that such a condition was more likely 
attributable to a congenital birth defect. As the body was quickly repatriated to Malaysia 
and buried according to Islamic tradition, no subsequent examinations were conducted to 
counter the observation of Dr. Idris. 
The same day as the press release, the Jakarta Globe (Indonesia’s most widely 
read newspaper) published a front-page article that sent the story viral across all sectors 
of Indonesian media.155 As a followup to his statement, Dr. Idris told reporters that he 
was sorry he had said anything in the first place and admitted that what he had said about 
Noordin’s condition was something that should have been kept confidential. This 
admitted “fault” was also heavily reported on by the media, lending further credibility to 
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the story.156 Official news coverage of Noordin’s questionable sexual orientation 
subsided the day after the press release, in favor of other stories, such as a magnitude 
7.6 earthquake off the coast of Sumatra that killed over 1,000 people.157 However, as a 
result of the speculation by official news sources, rumors branding Noordin as a sexual 
deviant quickly spread and thrived online, where they “were received without question” 
by the public.158 
Although never acknowledged as an attempt by the Indonesian government to 
instigate a state-sponsored whisper campaign, the two press releases by government 
officials, which implied, but did not explicitly declare Noordin as a sexual deviant, did 
just that. Bernardi contends that the initiation of the rumor, accusing Noordin of being a 
sodomite, “nullified his Islamist credentials in the eyes of many Muslims and rendered 
him a munafiq (hypocrite)” to the public.159 Noordin’s factional JI group—Tanzim 
Qaedat al-Jihad—floundered as a result of its leader having been portrayed as a 
homosexual and hypocrite. The rumor also had broader implications for the JI 
organization at large. Not only had the rumor robbed JI of the opportunity to portray 
Noordin as a pious Muslim martyr, the organization also shared the burden of Noordin’s 
hypocrisy.160 Bernardi summarizes, “after all, if one of its key leaders was gay, questions 
must be asked about the organization itself.”161 
Building on the criteria of successful rumors developed in Chapter II, this rumor 
is evaluated on the following five criteria: plausibility, simplicity, suitability, vividness, 
and suggestiveness. 
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The rumor regarding Noordin’s supposed sexual proclivity was plausible for three 
reasons. First, the audience had no reason to question such revealing information about 
the elusive terrorist. Little was known about Noordin’s personal life other than his having 
emigrated from Malaysia, which in itself made Noordin’s character suspect to a 
xenophobic Indonesian public. Second, the initial statement, very publicly made by Dr. 
Idris, followed by his lamentation at revealing such intimate details regarding the 
autopsy, “gave the information an official, truthful appearance” as Bernardi observes.162 
Finally, if Noordin was such a dangerous criminal, it was unlikely that anyone could 
forcibly sodomize him over a prolonged period; Noordin would have to have been a 
willing participant in the act.163 
2. Simplicity  
The rumor was initiated and propagated as a result of a very simple, but 
authoritative observation. In this case, a medical expert whose opinion was categorically 
trusted by the public commented that the condition of Noordin’s rectum was consistent 
with someone who had been passively sodomized over an extended period of time. This 
observation, communicated only twice by Indonesian authorities to the public, was not 
unnecessarily burdened with reinforcing details. The rumor spread, therefore, because the 
meaning of the forensic examiner’s observation could not be misconstrued or readily 
explained away. 
3. Suitability 
The initiation of the rumor was well suited to achieve the objective of 
posthumously discrediting Noordin, and the wider JI organization, as it played on  
three converging contexts of Indonesian culture: sexuality, religion, and nationality.164 
First, such a rumor mobilized prevailing Indonesian stereotypes, which characterize 
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homosexuals as being failed citizens, criminals, and mentally unstable.165 Bernardi also 
notes that the rumor invalidated Noordin’s cult of personality, “as accusations of passive 
sodomy emasculate the hyper-masculine terrorist.”166 
Second, the rumor suggested a lifestyle that was counter to the tenets of Islam, a 
faith with which approximately 90 percent of Indonesians identify. Bernardi claims that 
the implications of the rumor were “particularly damning and discrediting to the legacy 
of Noordin Top, an Islamist extremist who supposedly adhered to a very strict—and 
homophobic—interpretation of Islam.”167 As the rumor took hold, it undermined any 
moral justification for the attacks orchestrated by Noordin in the name of his faith. 
Third, the rumor took advantage of Noordin’s status as an outsider as a 
Malaysian. The prevailing Indonesian prejudice promoted the rumor, which characterizes 
Malaysians as being backward, immoral, and jealous of Indonesian society.168 Taken 
together, Bernardi claims that, “the state mobilized stereotypes of homosexuality, 
national antagonism with Malaysia, and the cathectic anxiety over anal sex in order to 
undermine the Islamist extremist narrative associated with ones of its heroes.”169 
4. Vividness 
The rumor about Noordin’s sexual deviance was unquestionably vivid. It evoked 
a moral reaction from the Indonesian public, which deems homosexuality as taboo and 
counter to the tenets of Islam. The notion that this once-perceived formidable foe of the 
government had actually been nothing more than a perverted reprobate was a titillating 
topic of discussion. While alive, Noordin was feared for his ability to conduct attacks at 
will, supernaturally evading any attempts by the Indonesian authorities to arrest him. 
After his death, the public’s fear of Noordin was transformed into mockery and contempt. 
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5. Suggestiveness 
Even though Dr. Idris did not explicitly state that he thought Noordin was 
homosexual, his mentioning of Noordin’s funnel-shaped anus during the press release 
certainly implied Noordin’s homosexuality. The audience was left to make the 
connection between the irregularities noted by the forensic examiner and Noordin’s 
supposed sexual proclivity. However, this logical leap was not difficult for the generally 
homophobic public to make.170 
6. Effect of Technology 
The transmediation of the Noordin Top story from the official to the unofficial 
news sources of Internet-based social networks gave the rumor its excessive reach and 
impact. Online postings about Noordin’s condition began the day after the autopsy report 
was released, with unofficial blog sites reposting the original news stories with new 
commentary.171 Such speculation through posting and reposting of the rumor contributed 
to Noordin Top having been the most searched term through Indonesian search engines in 
2009.172 
The nature of the rumor was well suited to online parody and crude jokes. Images, 
text, and video were manipulated from their original news sources, as Indonesian Internet 
prosumers—those producing as well as consuming content—began portraying Noordin 
as various effeminate caricatures of himself. Postings were made to blogsites, online 
forums, and video sharing websites, such as YouTube. Originally, such content was 
primarily aimed at attacking Noordin and the JI network by denouncing their hypocrisy; 
however, the attacks later devolved into the denouncement of Malaysians in general, 
Noordin having been Malaysian by birth. The latent conflict between Malaysians and 
Indonesians would help sustain and cement the rumor of Noordin’s supposed sexual 
deviancy as truth. The Noordin Top rumor helps to demonstrate the contention of  
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Bernardi that “the online news cycle . . . endlessly circulates and repositions the news in 
multiple forums and format, which is what makes it an ideal platform for a whisper 
campaign.”173 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed three cases where rumors were employed successfully to 
validate the criteria for effective rumor employment proposed in Chapter II. All three 
cases satisfied the criteria of plausibility, simplicity, suitability, vividness, and 
suggestiveness. In two of the cases—the Zionist conspiracy rumor and the Noordin 
Mohammad Top rumor—technology also played a crucial role in amplifying the reach 
and impact of the rumors. Although there may be cases of successful rumor employment 
where not all of the proposed criteria are obviously evident, the criteria must be satisfied 
to some degree, and the criteria must not conflict with one another, if a rumor is to 
promulgate. In cases in which the proposed criteria are not satisfied, or where the criteria 
conflict, a rumor will not become self-propelling or will become unrecognizably distorted 
from its original form to satisfy the criteria minimally before transmission takes place. 
The next chapter analyzes three cases that demonstrate the principles of rumor 
defense—seeking to tamp down rumors preventively, or to neutralize those that cannot be 
prevented—as proposed in Chapter II. The cases chosen for analysis include instances of 
where a rumor was, and was not successfully defended against; such a selection of cases 
also demonstrates the ramifications for an organization when it fails to defend against 
rumors successfully. 
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IV. TESTING THE PRINCIPLES OF RUMOR DEFENSE: THE 
REALMS OF POLITICS, BUSINESS, AND WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Influence practitioners must be prepared to defend against rumors because of their 
ability to influence populations directly. As an information operations tool, rumors are 
able to subvert, deceive, and to suggest what truth is to a population. Left unaddressed, a 
well-crafted rumor can quickly spread and can have a lasting effect on the perceptions, 
attitudes, and behaviors of a given target audience. 
Chapter II offered a set of general guidelines to abide by when defending against 
rumors that included being prepared to deal with rumors; taking prompt action once a 
rumor is identified; staying on message during refutation; controlling the narrative; 
minimizing misunderstanding; and taking responsibility for the truth. From these 
guidelines, Chapter II proposed two sets of criteria for rumor defense. The first set 
focused on preventing rumor generation, and included the reducing of environmental 
anxiety and uncertainty, as well as limiting the means of rumor dissemination. The 
second set focused on neutralizing rumors in circulation, and included ignoring impotent 
rumors, commenting on plausible rumors, confirming the truth, and refuting effectively. 
To test the proposed criteria for rumor defense, this chapter analyzes three cases 
in which rumors were employed to discredit an individual or organization, and the 
subsequent efforts by the target to defend against these rumors. Of the cases analyzed, 
two demonstrate successful attempts at rumor negation and one demonstrates an 
unsuccessful attempt to defend against rumors. Initially, each case is described in detail 
to provide context for discussion, followed by a critique of the defenders’ efforts. The 
first case centers on the attempted use of rumor by political opponents to defame Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt leading up to the 1932 presidential election. The second case focuses 
on the attempted use of rumor by Chinese protestors to initiate a boycott of the French 
retailer Carrefour, in response to a perceived insult directed at China, in the lead up to the 
Beijing Olympics. The third case traces the use of rumor by insurgents to subvert an 
information operations campaign by coalition forces in war-torn Iraq. These particular 
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cases were chosen because they provide historical and modern accounts; they 
demonstrate a mixture of success and failure in defending against rumors; and the rumors 
featured in each case satisfy the criteria for the effective employment of rumors described 
in the previous chapter, thus, reinforcing this previous concept. 
Overall, the chapter finds that, in addition to validating the proposed criteria for 
rumor defense, these case studies reveal that successfully defending against rumors 
requires exercising a mixture of both proactive and reactive measures effectively. These 
cases also provide six cautionary lessons for organizations failing to defend against 
rumors: First, when an organization or individual does not conduct methodical scanning 
of the information environment for conditions favoring rumor generation, it becomes 
susceptible to being blindsided by a particularly impactful rumor. Second, if the 
organization or individual does not act transparently, ethically, and responsibly in public, 
the information environment becomes more favorable to rumor generation. Third, if the 
organization or individual is unable to eliminate known sources of rumor, or fails to 
restrict those mediums or channels through which rumors propagate, rumor circulation 
and dispersion will occur more rapidly and broadly. Fourth, if the organization or 
individual ignores plausible rumors altogether, it partly cedes the information 
environment to the adversary, becoming increasingly vulnerable to future rumors. Fifth, 
if the organization or individual fails to address those details of rumors that are true, 
separating such truths from falsehoods at a later time becomes more difficult. Finally, 
time is of the essence: rumors left to fester are more difficult to counteract once they have 
taken root in the psyche of the target audience. 
B. WHISPERS AGAINST FDR IN 1932 
Prior to winning four consecutive bids for the U.S. presidency, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt (FDR) had to overcome a debilitating illness beginning in the summer of 1921, 
which threatened to turn public attention away from his New Deal initiative and toward 
concerns over the fragility of his health. While rumors concerning his health would 
continue to plague the president throughout the latter years of his political career, 
Roosevelt strove to prevent and neutralize such rumors during his second run for the 
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White House in 1932. This study examines rumors surrounding Roosevelt’s health in the 
political landscape of the 1932 presidential elections, and cites the proactive and reactive 
measures he and his public relations team took to defend against politically motivated 
whispers. 
In August 1921, Roosevelt, then the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, took a 
much-deserved vacation to his family’s summer cabin on Campobello Island in New 
Brunswick.174 On August 10, following the day’s activities—which had included sailing 
and swimming with his three older children, Anna, James, and Elliot—Roosevelt was 
suddenly overcome by fatigue, and began complaining to his wife of intense lower back 
pain.175 By the following morning, Roosevelt maintained a temperature of 102 degrees 
Fahrenheit and had lost the ability to move his legs.176 Roosevelt’s condition continued 
to worsen until August 25, at which time, the family physician diagnosed him with 
infantile paralysis, known more commonly as polio.177 The diagnosis marked the 
beginning of a long and arduous recovery process; however, by early winter, Roosevelt 
had already regained some upper body strength and his nervous system showed initial 
signs of recovery.178 After several years of rehabilitation at his home in Hyde Park, the 
disabled Roosevelt returned to the political stage and won election as the 44th Governor 
of New York in 1929.179 Roosevelt’s ill health scarcely affected his election to office, 
due in part to the masterful way in which his public relations team played down the 
severity of his disability, and because of an increased documentation of polio cases 
affecting older children, adolescents, and adults during the 1920s.180 
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However, once news had spread of his intent to run for office in the 1932 
presidential election, the public did not look favorably upon Roosevelt as rumors began 
to emerge, which called into question his ability to lead the country due to physical and 
mental limitations associated with his disability. Biographers Houck and Kiewe describe, 
“Letters, many anonymous, spread throughout the country, some even suggesting that 
Roosevelt was incapable of governing not because of his polio or even from a paralytic 
stroke, but because he suffered from syphilis.”181 Such anonymous content was fueled in 
part by public statements made by other political figures aimed at discrediting Roosevelt. 
Jesse E. Nicolson, the president of the National Woman’s Democratic Law Enforcement 
League at the time, wrote in Time magazine, “This candidate, while mentally qualified 
for the presidency, is entirely unfit physically.”182 As the rumors continued to intensify, 
Roosevelt and his public relations team knew they needed to act before the rhetoric 
concerning his disability grew more rampant, to the point it could not be repudiated. Such 
concern was valid because public perceptions regarding disabilities at the time were not 
as they are today. According to Hugh Gallagher, a disability advocate, during that time 
period, “to be handicapped in some visible way carried with it social opprobrium. The 
handicapped were kept at home, out of sight, in back bedrooms, by families who felt a 
mixture of embarrassment and shame about their presence.”183 Thus, Roosevelt had to 
act before his campaign was hijacked by ignorance and magniloquence. 
In response to the burgeoning rumors, Roosevelt turned to his long-time confidant 
and public relations expert, Louis Howe, to help develop a multipronged counter-rumor 
campaign. The first measure taken by Howe was to release a public statement that a 
$500,000 life insurance policy had been granted to Roosevelt.184 As an accompaniment 
to this news, “Dr. E.W. Beckwith, the medical director of the Equitable Life Assurance 
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Company, also issued a very public report testifying to Roosevelt’s excellent health—
both moral and physical.”185 The press subsequently interviewed Roosevelt and Dr. 
Beckwith in late 1930 and both attested to Roosevelt’s strong physical condition. The 
goal and the result of this measure were to decrease the anxiety surrounding the 
presidential hopeful’s upcoming campaign, by leveraging an authoritative and credible 
source as spokesperson. The medical report and subsequent public statement of Dr. 
Beckwith helped prevent the spread of additional rumors, while also forming a 
foundation of truth for reference as Roosevelt and his public relations team attempted to 
negate rumors concerning his health as the election primaries approached. 
Assisting with the refutation of the rumors regarding Roosevelt’s health, Earl 
Looker, a childhood friend and public relations specialist, wrote an article that 
emphasized Roosevelt’s physical fitness.186 Looker’s article was first published on July 
25, 1931, in Liberty Magazine, with advanced copies being distributed by Howe to 
leaders in the Democratic Party and any news correspondent who had conveyed 
skepticism of Roosevelt’s ability to lead due to the state of his health.187 Jim Farley, 
Roosevelt’s campaign manager, took the article written by Looker and thrust it into 
national distribution.188 The article not only refuted the rumors, but also maintained open 
dialogue with the public and conveyed themes for their countering. 
Despite such efforts, with the primaries drawing to a close, the rumors regarding 
Roosevelt were still gaining traction among certain segments of the American public. 
“The New York Times reported, ‘that a whisper campaign about [Roosevelt’s] physical 
condition was being spread throughout the Middle West in an effort to head off his 
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nomination by the Democrats in Chicago.’”189 Such news led Roosevelt to commit to an 
undertaking that would provide proof of his good health and vigor. In the event that 
Roosevelt won the 1932 Democratic nomination, he planned to fly to Chicago to receive 
the nomination in person. Houck and Kiewe note, “Such an embodied acceptance was not 
part of party tradition. Prior to 1932, the winning candidate would only be ‘informed’ of 
the nomination several weeks after the convention had concluded.”190 In July 1932, 
Roosevelt followed through with his plan and walked into the convention hall to address 
the crowd using an approach that obstructed the onlookers from seeing his lower 
extremities.191 His appearance in person and delivery of a speech laced with references to 
his strong physical condition and fortitude provoked a whirlwind of articles and editorials 
that described him as a strong and fit fighter, and confirmed him as a promising leader for 
the American people.192 This action continued to reinforce the notion that the rumors 
surrounding his health were false. 
Roosevelt and his team also worked diligently to restrict the mediums and 
channels of the rumors, best exemplified by the constant efforts of Looker to cajole the 
press, preventing them from commenting on or publishing photos depicting the limited 
use of Roosevelt’s legs. By his own effort, Looker was able to “encourage the press to 
respect Roosevelt’s disability and treat it as a private matter and not a public one and to 
encourage the press to report accurately on Roosevelt’s physical fitness—as long as such 
accuracy was in line with Looker’s description.”193 This gentleman’s agreement held 
throughout the presidential candidacy and shattered any possibilities for the poor-health-
naysayers to acquire written descriptions or provocative images that could be used as 
corroborating evidence for the rumors; thus, Looker effectively limited sources that could 
be used to fuel the rumors. 
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Resulting from a late onset of polio, Roosevelt did indeed suffer physical 
limitations in the ability to use his legs; knowing this, Roosevelt’s competitors and critics 
took the opportunity to emphasize these limitations—as well as other unsubstantiated 
claims of his diminished mental capabilities—to encourage the spread of rumors which 
called into question his ability to effectively lead the country. To quell such rumors, 
Roosevelt and his public relations team embarked on a multi-faceted counter-rumor 
campaign that incorporated a mixture of both proactive and reactive measures, captured 
in the criteria for the defense against rumors. To prevent the spread of rumors, Roosevelt 
and his team reduced environmental anxiety and uncertainty by providing the American 
public with positive images and favorable assessments of his health and vigor; 
conversely, they limited the distribution of damaging images and stories by the media, 
which reported otherwise. 
As part of the counter-rumor campaign, Roosevelt and his team also sought to 
neutralize rumors already in circulation. The team did not comment on rumors that were 
particularly too fantastic—such as the rumor about Roosevelt having contracted 
syphilis—as they did not want to lend greater credibility to such rumors. The team did, 
however, comment on the more plausible rumors regarding Roosevelt’s health and he 
conducted public appearances to prove such rumors false. The team was able to refute the 
rumors effectively by maintaining open dialogue with the public, by providing venues for 
supplementary information, sources of truth, and by relying on outside authorities to 
speak on Roosevelt’s behalf. These efforts successfully recast Roosevelt as a healthy and 
vigorous candidate. Roosevelt would go on to serve four terms in office—the most of any 
American president. 
C. TALKING ABOUT CARREFOUR IN CHINA  
In 2001, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced that China would 
host the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. While the Chinese celebrated the announcement with 
fireworks and an outburst of nationalism, many human rights groups denounced the 
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decision because of China’s record of human rights abuses.194 This prompted François 
Carrard, the executive director of the IOC, to make the following statement reaffirming 
the committee’s decision: 
Some people say, because of serious human rights issues, we close the 
door and say no… The other way is to bet on openness. Bet on the fact 
that in the coming seven years, openness, progress and development in 
many areas will be such that the situation will be improved. We are taking 
the bet that seven years from now we will see many changes.195 
However, for France and China, the issue did not end there. After a multitude of 
protests over China’s treatment of Tibet—which occurred as the 2008 Olympic Torch 
made the 85,000-mile journey from Greece to China—Chinese citizens began to rally 
around a rumor resulting from some rather intense protests in Paris.196 As part of the 
Chinese citizens’ response, they took action against the French retail giant, Carrefour. 
The Olympic Torch’s 129-day trip—named the “Journey of Harmony”—met stiff 
protests in the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the U.K.197 
Communications expert Timothy Coombs claims, “most protesters were pro-Tibet and 
were upset by China’s treatment of Tibet, while other protestors were using the Olympics 
as a chance to feature China’s poor human rights record.”198 The crisis escalated as the 
torch reached France. On April 7, 2008—the first day of the Paris leg—pro-Tibet 
protesters waved flags, threw eggs, and chanted “free Tibet” and “shame the games” as 
the athletes jogged past, forcing security personnel to extinguish the Olympic flame three 
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times in an effort to curb the unrest.199 This discontent forced officials to transport the 
torch by vehicle during portions of the route and subsequently cut short the Paris leg of 
the relay.200 As news of the events reached the Chinese in their home country, pictures 
surfaced of Jin Jing, a Chinese a paraplegic athlete, being threatened by protesters as she 
carried the torch in France. The news and the pictures of Jin Jing sparked immediate 
retaliation against the French Embassy and French businesses across China. Carrefour, 
which had 112 hypermarkets in China at the time—far more than any other foreign 
retailer including Wal-Mart—was the hardest hit by the backlash.201 
Although Carrefour had no direct association to the events that occurred in Paris, 
the company did have a strong presence in China and had become a symbol of France; 
therefore, it became the most visible target for Chinese retaliation.202 Chinese protestors 
started to organize boycotts and demonstrations against Carrefour, along with other 
French-based companies, via an online campaign.203 The rumor, although unfounded, 
stated that the major shareholder to the company had donated money to the Dalai Lama; 
thus, the company was seen as supporting Tibetan independence.204 This rumor posed a 
tremendous threat to the Carrefour Corporation and its stake in China’s large and 
lucrative market. As the rumor-powered boycotts took hold, Coombs notes that 
Carrefour’s “May 1st holiday sales were estimated to be 10 percent below the previous 
year.”205 Left untreated, the spreading rumor threatened Carrefour’s already fragile image 
in China and would continue to undercut company revenues.206 
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As the rumor circulated throughout Chinese cyberspace and began to intensify, 
Carrefour published several statements intended to limit the anxiety of the Chinese public 
and to refute the rumor with the truth. To limit anxiety, Carrefour’s chairman, Jose Luis 
Duran, released the following statement in an attempt to separate the company from the 
Paris incidents: 
Obviously, recent sabotage incidents in Paris during the Olympic Torch 
relay hurt the feeling of the Chinese people, made them angry and 
triggered their protests. I hope that the preparations for the Olympics will 
be implemented with a harmonious atmosphere. The success of the 
Beijing Olympics will benefit all the people.207 
In this statement, Duran chose to comment on the incident that sparked the 
creation of the rumor, the French Olympic Torch protests. In doing so, he expressed 
empathy for the underlying Chinese grievances and attempted to separate his company 
from the incident. After appealing to the concerns of the Chinese protestor, Duran went 
on to address the rumor directly by stating that, “these allegations are groundless. 
Carrefour and its branches have given no direct or indirect support to any political or 
religious group.”208 By issuing such statements, Duran confirmed the truth (Carrefour 
does not and will not support political and religious groups), while denying falsehoods 
associated with a rumor (the allegations are groundless); thus, while helping to build his 
corporation’s reputation for transparency, and fostering a trusting relationship with the 
public, Duran also increased the chances that the audience would be receptive to his anti-
rumor message by first recognizing and separating Carrefour from the Paris Olympic 
Torch debacle, the true reason for the audience’s concerns,. Furthermore, his position 
within the company made Duran an authoritative source on donations and monetary 
disbursements of the company and its stakeholders. 
Working on behalf of Carrefour, the French government also provided assistance 
by applying political pressure on the Chinese government to take a more active role in 
curtailing the spread of the rumor. Such cooperation resulted from the French having sent 
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a special envoy to Beijing, intent on restoring bilateral relations between the two nations. 
The envoy emphasized France’s desire to restore the image of its leading retailer, which 
was a major distributer of Chinese products abroad. The economic pressure realized by a 
threat to reduce the distribution of Chinese goods encouraged the Chinese government to 
block Internet sites that had been spreading the rumor.209 This action did not directly 
refute the rumor, but it did satisfy two criteria of rumor defense. First, the act eliminated 
known sources of the rumor by preventing access by large portions of the Chinese 
population. Second, the act sent a clear message from the government to the protesters 
themselves to stop boycotting and facilitating the spread of the rumor. Such an action 
demonstrates how an authoritative and credible third party can effectively curtail the 
spread of a rumor. 
This case illustrates how a corporation used elements of the criteria for rumor 
defense to stop the spread of a rumor that was both fiscally costly and damaging to its 
public image. The case provides an appreciation of how to combat rumors by addressing 
underlying grievances to reduce anxiety, by promoting transparency in the refutation of 
rumors, by using an authoritative source as spokesman, and incorporating third party 
actors in the defense. 
D. THE TRIANGLE OF DEATH: U.S. FORCES IN IRAQ 
From 2003 to 2011, the challenge facing Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the 
military command overseeing coalition forces in the country, was daunting. After 
toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, MNF-I inherited the responsibility of 
facilitating the rebuilding and governing of a country that had had its infrastructure 
decimated, its governmental services disrupted, and its population embittered as a result 
of the conflict. Even under ideal conditions—with an inundation of resources, an 
indigenous and legitimate governing body leading the effort, and a compliant and 
supportive population—the complete resuscitation of a nation following war is a 
monumental undertaking; however, the conditions in Iraq were far from ideal. MNF-I 
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was wholly unprepared to fix what it had broken, and what Saddam himself had already 
neglected through 30 years of dictatorship and over 10 years of international sanctions; in 
short, the resources to establish law and order, to restore essential services, and to provide 
adequate humanitarian aid were greatly atrophied.210 The Iraqi Interim Government, 
established in June 2004, was neither seen as legitimate by the civilian population, nor 
effective at carrying out its duties.211 Whereas coalition forces were first greeted with 
jubilation by the Iraqi people for having ousted Saddam, such positive sentiment 
eventually began giving way to disillusionment over the lack of noticeable reconstruction 
efforts and a growing perception of foreign occupation. 
It was in this contentious environment of uncertainty and fear that the insurgency 
in Iraq was born. In its earliest stages, foreign jihadists, Ba’ath Party loyalists, and 
disgruntled Iraqi soldiers made up the Sunni insurgency; however, insurgent ranks 
increasingly grew to include Iraqi citizens who were either initially sympathetic to the 
coalition or, at the very least, previously uncommitted. One of the keys to winning the 
Iraqi population to either side was the control of the information environment, something 
coalition forces initially failed to grasp, but which the insurgents were keenly aware of. In 
other words, whichever side could command the loyalty of the population, while 
conversely denying such loyalty to its opponent, would be victorious in the struggle. 
Managing information and rumors was critical to winning the support and loyalty of the 
population. 
MNF-I needed to pursue a comprehensive information operations campaign—
something that was initially lacking in the overall coalition strategy—directed at 
engaging key segments of the Iraqi population; the coalition also needed to make an 
aggressive effort to challenge enemy propaganda by responding rapidly with counter 
messages, something that it rarely did effectively.212 Four years into the insurgency, 
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Andrew Garfield, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and strategic 
communication consultant, observed, “while the coalition fumbles with its information 
operations, the insurgents and militia groups are adept at releasing timely messages to 
undermine support for the Iraqi government and bolster their own perceived potency.”213 
Garfield cited the slowness of the coalition’s approval process for information operations 
products as a hindrance, which “creates an information vacuum that Iraqis fill with 
conspiracy theories and gossip often reflecting the exaggerations or outright lies of [the] 
insurgents.”214 As the insurgents maintained the information initiative by producing 
timely messages, disseminated at the grass roots level by word of mouth, competing 
organizations within MNF-I saturated the airwaves and print media with conflicting 
messages long after their period of relevancy had passed.215 MNF-I needed to think 
strategically but act quickly at the local level; failing to do so, the coalition often 
surrendered the information environment to the insurgents. 
A pointed example of the insurgents’ ability to trump the information operations 
of coalition forces occurred in the so-called “Triangle of Death” in early 2005. Just south 
of Baghdad, this agricultural area remained one of the most restive regions in Iraq, where 
Sunni insurgents operated with impunity, attacking coalition forces and coopting support 
from the local population.216 In an attempt to wrest control of the area away from the 
insurgents, American civil affairs teams began to inoculate livestock as part of a larger 
information operations campaign in support of MNF-I efforts to counteract insurgent 
activities.217 The campaign was, however, short-lived; insurgents spread a rumor 
throughout the local population that the Americans were not in fact vaccinating their 
livestock, but were poisoning the herds. Bernardi summarizes the impact of this rumor: 
For farmers already wary of the U.S. and coalition presence, wracked by 
fear of societal and political instability, and suffering livestock losses to 
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disease and a rapidly dwindling water supply, the bovine poisoning rumor 
explained the deaths of the herds, predicted future loss and gloom, and 
linked the cause of their current woes to the U.S. invasion and occupation. 
It provided a target for pent-up frustration, anxiety, and fear that led some 
farmers to turn a blind eye to insurgent activities and others to participate 
in violence. MNF-I’s information operation and civil affairs mission 
backfired. The insurgents gained narrative ground at a crucial juncture in 
the war effort.218 
Even though the bovine poisoning rumor itself posed a challenge to coalition 
forces operating in the area, its impact was magnified by its integration with three other 
rumors in circulation at the time: that American helicopters were causing an increase in 
damaging sandstorms; that the presence of American forces was contributing to a severe 
drought by consuming precious water reserves; and that American forces came to Iraq to 
steal the nation’s oil.219 Once identified, these rumors were often dismissed by coalition 
forces as being too fantastic, and not something to be addressed seriously, though, in 
retrospect, they should have been confronted. The rumors’ net effect was to counteract an 
information operations campaign and to channel more local support to the insurgents. 
Bernardi notes that this case demonstrates how “otherwise diverse rumors [can] 
cluster around and end up advancing narratives that are widely understood by a specific 
community.”220 Left unchallenged, these rumors supported an insurgent narrative that the 
Americans intended to decimate the Iraqi population so that they could fleece Iraq of its 
natural resources. Bernardi further asserts that such rumors ended up “portraying 
American forces and interests as an existential threat to the people the United States is 
trying to protect and to the host nation it supports. Thus, these rumors contribute to a 
point of view that the Americans and the cooperating government of Iraq, not the 
insurgents, are the enemies that the people must defeat.”221 
In this case, the target of the rumor failed to employ either proactive or reactive 
measures to defend MNF-I actions and subsequently suffered the damaging consequences 
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of inaction. MNF-I made no concerted effort to prevent rumor generation in the first 
place, although arguably it had limited options for doing so. Environmental anxiety and 
uncertainty are natural byproducts of war, giving the insurgents’ fertile ground to sow 
rumors among the local population. 
Anticipating these conditions, coalition forces should have made every effort to 
reduce the population’s apprehension by maintaining regular and open dialogue with the 
local communities about their fears, by expanding public access to institutional media to 
inform a wider audience about changing environmental conditions, and by demonstrating 
efforts to counteract the effects of the ongoing drought. Being as transparent as possible, 
by providing explanations for their actions—such as informing the population about the 
need for the inoculation project in advance—would also have helped to reduce the locals’ 
uncertainty. As Bernardi suggests, the best way to combat rumors in a conflict 
environment is to “saturate contested terrains with accurate and timely information,” 
which can “serve as obstacles to the flow of rumors that occur in information 
vacuums.”222 Coalition forces were also limited in their options for reducing the spread of 
the rumors, as they were being promulgated by word of mouth via multiple sources—a 
primary provocateur could not be identified.223 Even so, efforts should have been made 
to categorize and track the rumors to better understand how they were spread and their 
patterns of trans-mediation for future neutralization. 
Once coalition forces identified that such rumors were in circulation, they should 
have made every effort to dispel the rumors with truth whenever they were encountered; 
however, as previously noted, at the time commanders thought the rumors too fantastic to 
be taken seriously. Seemingly, coalition forces were correctly adhering to the first 
criterion of rumor neutralization—ignoring impotent rumors—but they failed to assess 
the rumors from the perspective of the local Iraqi population, and instead judged them 
from their own perspective. Bernardi surmises that, to the locals “the explanation implicit 
in the bovine poisoning and associated rumors was plausible and even rational.”224 These 
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rumors made sense to the Iraqis because of their heightened concern for safety and future 
access to resources, and because “official and trustworthy communication keeping the 
population informed about government progress was inconsistent to non-existent.”225 By 
the time coalition forces realized that the rumors were indeed something to be taken 
seriously, there was no real opportunity to counteract them. The rumors had been allowed 
to comingle with the truth for so long that they had become entrenched in the local 
psyche as fact—something less and less likely to be dispelled with the passage of time. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed two cases of successful rumor negation and one 
unsuccessful attempt to defend against rumors. The first case, centered on the attempted 
defamation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt by political opponents, demonstrated a 
successful defense against rumor with the employment of both proactive and reactive 
measures. Roosevelt and his public relations team effectively leveraged interviews, print 
media, negotiations, and public appearances to reduce environmental anxiety and 
uncertainty and limited the means of rumor dissemination; additionally, they ignored 
impotent rumors, commented on plausible rumors, confirmed the truth, and refuted the 
allegations effectively. 
The second case, which centered on the attempted attack of the French retailer 
Carrefour by Chinese protesters, demonstrated a partially successful defense against 
rumor with the employment of reactive measures. Carrefour, with the help of the French 
and Chinese governments, developed an anti-rumor strategy that reduced environmental 
anxiety and uncertainty and limited the means of rumor dissemination; they also 
effectively neutralized rumors in circulation by confirming the truth and by refuting 
plausible rumors effectively. The third case, which focused on the use of rumor by 
insurgents to subvert an information operations campaign in Iraq, demonstrated an 
unsuccessful defense against rumor with the failure by the target to employ any measures 
effectively. 
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While none of the selected cases by itself has demonstrated all the proposed 
criteria for rumor defense, when taken together, the cases do support their validation. 
However, further research is warranted to confirm this initial validation. In addition to 
validating the criteria for rumor defense, the analysis also yielded cautionary lessons for 
failing to adhere to the criteria, demonstrating the negative results of such a deviation. 
These lessons emphasized the need for an organization to conduct methodical scanning of 
the information environment for conditions favoring rumor generation; to act 
transparently, ethically, and responsibly in public; eliminate known sources of rumor by 
restricting those mediums or channels through which rumors propagate; consider rumors 
from the perspective of the target audience, taking seriously those rumors which are 
plausible to the target audience; address those details of rumors which are true; and act 
quickly, as rumors left to fester are more difficult to counteract once they have taken root 
in the psyche of the target audience. 
In the next chapter, two new models are introduced to assist the influence 
practitioner with the employment of, and defense against, rumors. These models are 
based upon conclusions drawn after assessing the academic literature on the subject of 
rumors, and the review and recognition of a gap in current U.S. military doctrine. The 
chapter then concludes with a recapitulation of the major themes of this study, 
emphasizing those principles of rumor employment and defense to be incorporated into 
the future doctrine and training of psychological operations forces. 
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V. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, many of the United States’ competitors embrace and employ rumors as 
part of their overall information operations campaigns. For example, the Russians created 
the Internet Research Agency (IRA), whose primary mission is to seed rumors both 
domestically and internationally. The IRA has fielded topics ranging from attacks on 
Putin’s political opponents to fake reports of Ebola. In December 2014, Russia spread a 
rumor purporting the death of an unarmed African American woman at the hands of 
police officers in the United States, presumably to increase tension in the areas affected 
by the Ferguson, Missouri, protests.226 Countries like Russia are perfecting their skills 
and are quickly learning how to craft effective and relevant rumors that have a lasting 
impact. Therefore, it is critical that the United States reexamines its information 
operations doctrine and incorporates unique tools to combat these emerging threats, as 
well as develop its own rumor capability. 
As demonstrated in this thesis, rumors were effective tools of influence ranging 
from rumor propagation to help deter Germans in World War II, to affecting the beliefs 
and actions of everyday citizens participating in social movements in the digital 
information age. However, despite the demonstrated effectiveness of rumors as a tool of 
influence, the U.S. military has largely forgotten this skill and effectively propagating 
and countering rumors has all but disappeared from its doctrine and training. This failure 
to educate the U.S. military and PSYOP community in particular has hindered the use of 
rumors as a valuable tool to influence foreign target audiences, and leaves U.S. military 
forces vulnerable to enemies who have demonstrated the ability to propagate rumors with 
great success. The key to overcoming the obstacles posed by rumors, as well as taking 
advantage of the opportunities they present, begins with an understanding of the 
principles governing their nature. 
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This study flowed from a review of current and historical influence doctrine, in 
search of informal techniques that could be used to influence foreign audiences 
indirectly. Military doctrine of the OSS during the 1940s included rumor theory, based on 
the writings of Robert Knapp. However, with the dissolution of the OSS in 1945, such 
tenets were not reincorporated into subsequent editions of influence doctrine, except for a 
brief mention in a PSYOP manual from 1994, which has subsequently been rescinded.227 
Even where rumor theory was mentioned in military doctrine, focus was given to the 
crafting and employment of effective rumors based on a nascent understanding of the 
subject. Doctrine has not discussed how the influence practitioner is to recognize and 
counter rumors employed by the enemy; neither has doctrine accounted for the 
implications of advances of technology since the 1940s. 
This study synthesized previous academic and doctrinal work on the subject of 
rumors, and proposed a set of principles to employ and defend against rumors effectively. 
Specifically, effective rumors are characteristically uncomplicated and easy to remember; 
they are based on the current interests and circumstances of their audience; they exploit 
emotions and sentiments, and they follow historical precedents. Effective rumors also 
require the satisfaction of five criteria: plausibility, simplicity, suitability, vividness, 
and—in some cases—suggestiveness. 
The second set of principles covered the defense against rumors, with general 
guidelines for a defense against rumors including being prepared to deal with rumors, 
taking prompt action once rumors emerge, staying on message when refuting rumors, 
controlling the narrative, minimizing misunderstanding when refuting rumors, and taking 
responsibility for the truthful elements of any rumor. Under the guidelines for defense, 
two sets of criteria were given for preventing and neutralizing rumors. Preventing rumors 
requires reducing environmental anxiety and ambiguity, while limiting an adversary’s 
means to disseminate rumors. Neutralizing rumors requires ignoring those that are 
impotent, commenting on those that are plausible, confirming the truth, and refuting 
falsehoods effectively. 
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These sets of principles were then tested through case studies. Three case studies 
investigated successful rumor propagation, including a rumor that the British could set 
the English Channel on fire during World War II to thwart attempts at invasion; a rumor 
that claimed the September 11 attacks were a Zionist plot; and a rumor that discredited 
terrorist leader Noordin Top after his death. The study then investigated two examples of 
the successful defense against rumors, including the defense against a rumor that inflated 
the effects of polio on FDR during his 1932 campaign for the American presidency; and 
the successful defense of a rumor that instigated a boycott against the retailer Carrefour in 
China in 2008. The thesis also investigated one case of the failure to defend against 
rumors, specifically rumors during Operation Iraqi Freedom that claimed American 
forces were attempting to starve the Iraqi population into submission by killing livestock 
and destroying crops. 
In all three cases of rumor employment, actors successfully propagated rumors by 
satisfying each element of the proposed five criteria (plausibility, simplicity, suitability, 
vividness, and suggestiveness). The rumor that the British possessed a new incendiary 
weapon, capable of setting surface water ablaze, was plausible to the anxiety-filled ranks 
of the German military. It was simple in that it contained little supplementary information 
about the new weapon itself. It was suitable to its purpose of sowing fear and doubt, as 
well as vivid, as demonstrated by its gossip-worthiness among German soldiers. Finally, 
it was suggestive by leaving its content and conclusion open for interpretation, allowing 
the rumor to adapt to changing circumstances. 
The rumor a Zionist conspiracy perpetrated the September 11 attacks was 
plausible to Muslim and Middle Eastern audiences because it nested with the already 
strong prejudice of its audience against the state of Israel. It was simple in its design, 
allowing its audience to tailor the rumor depending on environmental needs, and was 
suitable to bolster anti-Semitism by exploiting the increased global fear and sense of 
ambiguity as a result of the attacks. Furthermore, it was vivid in its emotional 
provocativeness, and was suggestive of possible future catastrophes befalling its 
audience. 
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The rumor that Noordin Top was a homosexual was plausible because little was 
publicly known about Noordin’s personal life and a trusted official of the Indonesian 
government provided the evidence suggesting his sexual deviancy. It was simple in that 
the forensic examiner’s observation that Noordin had endured repeated trauma to his anal 
cavity could not be misconstrued or easily explained away. It was suitable to discredit 
Noordin by playing on the Indonesian cultural contexts of sexuality, religion, and 
nationality, and was vivid in its elicitation of a moral reaction to a cultural taboo against 
homosexuality. Finally, it was suggestive because the forensic examiner never explicitly 
stated his judgment on Noordin’s sexual orientation; he merely provided the evidence, 
allowing the audience to draw its own conclusion. 
The analysis of these cases supports the validation of all five criteria of rumor 
employment, with all the criteria being satisfied in each case. The analysis suggests that, 
where the proposed criteria are not satisfied, or where the criteria conflict with one 
another, a rumor will not become self-propelling or will become unrecognizably distorted 
from its original form, and thus fail to propagate effectively and influence the intended 
audience. 
However, this initial analysis of successful rumor propagation and defense left 
unanswered which variables were most important, and how the variables affected one 
another. Future study should be given to the potential weighting of each criterion that 
might determine their importance and connection to one another in effective rumor 
propagation. 
The three cases concerned with rumor defense included a mixture of the six 
proposed criteria for rumor prevention (reducing environmental anxiety and uncertainty, 
and limiting the means of rumor dissemination) and neutralization (ignoring impotent 
rumors, commenting on plausible rumors, confirming the truth, and refuting effectively). 
The politically motivated rumor targeting FDR’s physical and mental health was defeated 
by the use of statements from authoritative and credible spokespersons to decrease the 
public’s anxiety about FDR’s health, by restricting mediums that intended to circulate the 
rumor, by not commenting on implausible related rumors, and by maintaining open 
dialogue with the public. The rumor initiated by Chinese activists to cause a boycott of 
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the retailer Carrefour was defeated by restricting access to Internet sites spreading the 
rumor, and by Carrefour’s use of a credible spokesperson to refute allegations using the 
truth, while promoting an image of transparency through open dialogue with the Chinese 
public. The one case of unsuccessful defense against rumors—the failure of coalition 
forces to defend against a series of rumors propagated by insurgents in Iraq—
demonstrated the organization’s failure to employ any of the six rumor defense criteria. 
Coalition forces did not employ proactive measures to prevent the circulation of the 
insurgents’ rumors. Furthermore, they did not maintain open dialogue with the local 
populace to explain the real cause of the drought and the purpose for the inoculation 
campaign. Coalition forces also did not employ reactive measures against insurgent 
rumors once they were identified in circulation, primarily because the rumors were 
thought too fantastic to be believed by the local populace. As a result of their perceptual 
bias, coalition forces made no effort to refute the rumors that were in fact credible to the 
farmers, which allowed the rumors to become entrenched in the local psyche as fact. 
Once ingrained, these rumors derailed an important information operations campaign in 
the area, and channeled more support from the populace to the insurgents. 
The analysis of these cases suggests that a mixture of both proactive and reactive 
measures form the best defense against rumors and, thus, supports the tenuous validation 
of all six criteria of rumor defense. The defense against the rumor targeting FDR 
adequately demonstrates the satisfaction of all criteria; the defense against the rumor 
targeting Carrefour demonstrates the satisfaction of the criteria for neutralizing a rumor; 
and the failure to defend against the rumor targeting coalition forces demonstrates the 
results of not satisfying any of the criteria. Collectively, these cases suggest the need for 
an organization to conduct methodical scanning of the information environment for 
conditions favoring rumor generation; to act transparently, ethically, and responsibly in 
public; and to eliminate known sources of rumor by restricting those mediums or 
channels through which rumors propagate. Further, the case studies reveal the importance 
of considering rumors from the perspective of the target audience, taking seriously those 
rumors that are plausible to the target audience. Rumor defense should also address 
details of rumors that are true, and act quickly, because rumors left to fester are more 
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difficult to counteract once they have taken root in the psyche of the target audience. 
Future study should focus on further substantiating the proposed criteria, or working 
toward the proposition of additional criteria for rumor defense. 
The study concludes by proposing two new models based on these case study 
findings, the rumor employment cycle and the rumor defense process. These models will 
help assist the influence practitioner with the employment of, and defense against, rumors 
in the modern security environment. 
B. RUMOR EMPLOYMENT CYCLE (REC) 
Influence practitioners need a clear understanding of both friendly and operational 
environments to create, spread, and evaluate the success of a rumor effectively. The REC 
can help aid influence practitioners as a planning tool that helps influencers craft,	
synchronize,	 spread,	 and	 evaluate	 rumors. Specifically, the REC consists of six 
components: gathering intelligence, planning, identifying conditions, dissemination, 
assessment, reinforcement, and feedback. This cycle is depicted in Figure 4. The 
following sections elaborate on each of the components of the REC. 
Figure 4.  Elements of the Rumor Employment Cycle 
 
 
Intelligence plays a fundamental role in rumor employment by providing planners 
with foundational knowledge on potential target audiences. Intelligence needs to account 
for all aspects of a target audience, including their beliefs, perceptions, fears, and 
environmental or social factors. This intelligence is then used by planners to create a 
general understanding of a target audience within the context of their social and cultural 
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framework, while accounting for changes and potential opportunities in the operational 
environment. This information is also used later in the process to craft relevant and 
effective rumors. The more up-to-date and culturally relevant the intelligence gathered 
during this phase determines how smoothly subsequent phases of the process will be. 
Finally, intelligence needs to be constantly sought and accounted for throughout the 
remaining phases of the employment cycle for the rumor to be relevant. 
The planning phase of the REC is critical to the success of any operation because 
the prospective employment of rumors must be aligned and synchronized with the overall 
operation at its conception. This process allows the staff and the commander to examine 
the probable benefits and risks of rumor employment. Furthermore, in this phase of the 
planning process, once the risks and opportunities are identified, the plan may incorporate 
elements to mitigate the risk while maximizing the likelihood that potential opportunities 
are exploitable in the future by setting conditions early. 
During the planning phase, the rumor-planning cell begins to craft sets of rumors 
based on known or perceived conditions and operational goals. The planning cell also 
begins to research the best channels for the rumors to be disseminated and additional 
channels from which to gain feedback. Likewise, during this phase, the planning cell in 
charge of rumor creation should become integrated into the operations cell to facilitate 
synchronization and unity of effort across the military staff. 
Once baseline intelligence is acquired, and the rumor-planning cell is 
incorporated into the staff and plan, the REC moves into its next phase of identifying 
conditions that will facilitate the spread of the rumor. Bordia and Defonzo assert that 
studies on rumor theory have confirmed, “that rumor susceptibility depends on whether 
there is an optimum combination of uncertainty and anxiety.”228 Rumors fill knowledge 
gaps in times of uncertainty or when people lack information on ambiguous situations.229 
For example, rumors had become pervasive in the former Soviet Union around the time 
of its collapse because state-run news sources were perceived to be untrustworthy, 
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especially surrounding important events.230 Bordia and Defonzo posit that in uncertain 
environments, such as those created in the former Soviet Union, “rumors are explanations 
that give ‘structuring’ or ‘frame’ to the ambiguous events within a context. Rumors give 
the events meaning and predictability, and this eases the discomfort.”231 
While uncertainty stokes a desire for information in an ambiguous situation, 
anxiety drives people to seek answers. Bordia and Difonzo define anxiety in this context 
as, “the fear that negative events will likely occur or that positive events won’t occur.”232 
Under these conditions, people are more likely to spread rumors, and anxiety is the 
strongest associated factor tied to rumor propagation.233 With little knowledge of a 
situation, and the perceived fear that negative or at the very least less-than-positive 
outcomes will arise, people seek to control the uncertainty of the situation by listening to 
and spreading rumors.234 Therefore, uncertainty and anxiety increase the planner’s 
likelihood that a well-constructed rumor will spread across the desired target audience. 
With the identification of the proper environmental conditions, planners then 
disseminate the rumor to the population. This process requires using different channels to 
ensure that the rumor takes hold and continues to spread toward its desired target. This 
phase is as equally a science as it is an art. Bordia, Difonzo, and Rosnow contend that 
two scientific aspects require consideration when disseminating a rumor. 
First, as cognitive psychologists have shown, repetition fosters belief. 
Merely hearing a tale several times increases our confidence in its 
veracity. Second, as a rumor circulates, it mutates into a more plausible 
proposition. During social interchange, rumors don’t merely get relayed, 
they get refined according to what the transmitter believes is true.235 
Dissemination is also an art because it is often hard to determine which 
individuals or groups are the most effective communicators of the rumor. To aid in this 
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aspect, dissemination techniques need to incorporate what Malcolm Gladwell describes 
in his book, The Tipping Point, as a connector. For Gladwell, a connector is a person who 
likes and needs to make connections with a greater number of people.236 These 
connectors act as information hubs of large networks and thereby decrease the degree of 
separation between people.237 By providing rumors to connectors—such as bartenders 
and barbers—it increases the likelihood that the rumor will be transmitted to a large 
portion of their personal and professional networks. In the modern digital world, 
bartenders and barbers may not be the most effective connectors to spread the rumor, 
rather connectors who have large digital footprints and networks via social media or 
blogs can prove more effective. 
In either case of real or digital world connectors, several of Cialdini’s “principles 
of influence” are applicable to narrowing the field of potential effective connectors. 
According to Cialdini, the six principles of influence (reciprocity, authority, scarcity, 
commitment and consistency, liking, and social proof) “produce a distinct kind of 
automatic, mindless compliance from people, that is, a willingness to say yes without 
thinking first.”238 For the purposes of rumors, these principles increase the rumor’s 
acceptance by others when delivered by people who have the credentials of liking, social 
proof, or authority. The principle of liking states that, “most prefer to say yes to the 
requests of people we know and like.”239 Therefore, people who are liked, or followed in 
digital or real life, have greater influence on the people who like or are following them. 
Social proof is the notion that people, “view a behavior as correct in a given situation to 
the degree that we see others performing it.”240 For rumors, the more connectors who 
adopt the rumor create a “proof” for others that the rumor is true, and thereby, exert 
social pressure on others to assume the same belief. The principle of authority states, 
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“deference to authorities can occur in a mindless fashion as a kind of decision-making 
shortcut.”241 If someone is identified as an authority, people are more likely to believe 
what they say is fact without questioning its validity, which eases acceptance rates and 
furthers promulgation. 
As a rumor disseminates through a population, the planning team must assess its 
usefulness and determine whether to reinforce it with additional information, facts, or 
rumors. Additional information or facts (perceived or real) can add further credibility to a 
rumor. Subsequent rumors can also add strength to the original rumor or create more 
ambiguity that the defender must suppress before restoring clarity to the situation and 
confidence among the population. Furthermore, during this phase planners may conclude 
that the rumor needs no further prompting. This conclusion may arise because the rumor 
is spreading virally and has gained wide acceptance, or because the rumor has failed to 
spread and has had limited effect on the population.  
The last element to discuss in the REC is feedback. Feedback consists of the 
retrieval of information on the conditions of the environment and population regarding 
rumor promulgation and acceptance; feedback allows for the assessment of disseminated 
rumors, and builds understanding for the employment of future rumors. Channels that 
carry this information back to the planners can span the full range of intelligence sources, 
from the clandestine to open source. The advent of modern communications technology 
has only increased the channels through which real-time feedback is received. These 
advancements allow planners to assess the progress and effectiveness of rumors more 
accurately. The key aspect to feedback is that it is continually sought, and adjusted for, 
throughout the REC. 
C. RUMOR DEFENSE PROCESS (RDP) 
As has been demonstrated through the case studies in the previous chapters, it is 
decidedly more difficult to defend against rumors than to employ them effectively. To 
prepare a defense against rumors successfully, encompassing prevention and 
neutralization, a coordinated effort across a joint military staff is required. Although the 
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preponderance of the responsibility for identifying rumors and assessing their potential 
impact lies with members of the J2 (intelligence) and the J39 (information operations) 
sections, input to the planning and support for the execution of a rumor prevention or 
neutralization plan is required by the J3 (operational planning), J5 (future operational 
planning), and the PAO (public affairs office) sections to be effective. 
To help coordinate efforts for the defense against rumors, this study proposes 
adherence to the RDP depicted in Figure 5, which is loosely based on a reputation and 
strategic management model proposed by public relations expert John Dalton.242 
Beginning with the identification of rumors present in the environment, the RDP follows 
a progression of four stages to neutralize their effect against the organization: analysis, 
monitoring, strategy development, and strategy implementation. The following sections 
discuss the RDP is greater detail. 
Figure 5.  The Rumor Defense Process 
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The RDP begins by identifying key conditions in the external environment that 
favor rumor generation. This process requires the active collection of data and 
information by scanning the environment. Although the J2 is already engaged in the 
process of collecting information, input from the J39 is required to help focus collection 
efforts on the presence of conditions giving rise to rumors among a population. 
Collection efforts should focus particularly on the introduction of events that increase 
uncertainty and ambiguity in the environment, which an adversary might use to advance a 
rumor. Events that an adversary could take advantage of include significant changes in 
the political, economic, social, environmental, or legal structures affecting a population, 
which could be attributed back to the military organization.243 
Furthermore, information collection efforts, specifically focusing on the 
generation of rumors, should look to a range of formal and informal sources to include, 
but not limited to: newspapers; social media and networks; online communities; 
government statements; research publications; religious proclamations; social 
conversations at restaurants, bars and shops; protest group slogans; labor union minutes; 
university campus conversations; human intelligence sources; conversations with host 
nation politico-military leaders; and the publications of non-governmental organizations. 
This focused scanning of the environment will help the J2 and J39 to identify rumors in 
their nascency. 
Once a rumor has been identified, the first stage of the RDP centers on rumor 
analysis by the J2 and J39. This stage establishes the facts and premises upon which the 
rumor is based, and examines the potential impact of the rumor. Rumors should be 
analyzed with regard to their relevance to the population, the frequency of their mention, 
the diversity of mediums used to propagate them, and their source, if the source can be 
ascertained. Such an analysis helps to project an anticipated life cycle of the rumor, 
ranging from its emergence to resolution. The rumor analysis stage concludes with a 
forecasting of the rumor’s potential reach and impact. 
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After analysis, the next stage of the RDP is monitoring of the rumor. This stage 
requires continued environmental scanning by the J2 and J39 to determine any change in 
the intensity of the rumor’s propagation, to note any modifications to the rumor since its 
analysis, and to determine whether the rumor is being interwoven with any others, giving 
it a greater impact potential. The purpose of this stage is to track the life cycle of the 
rumor to determine whether it is gaining traction with a population, and if so, to 
determine what the impact of the rumor would have on the organization if left unchecked. 
Those rumors that appear to be impotent should be allowed to resolve themselves without 
interference by the organization, as simply acknowledging the rumor may give it greater 
credibility than it would have otherwise had. Rumors that appear to be gaining traction, 
or have the potential for the greatest impact, should be countered before they become a 
crisis for the government, military or organization. 
The next stage of the RDP, the development of a neutralization strategy for 
potentially impactful rumors, requires input from, and coordination between, the J39, 
PAO, J3, and J5. During this stage, members of the operational staff determine how to 
respond to the rumor based upon environmental restrictions and resource constraints. 
With the assistance of the PAO, J3 and J5, the J39 crafts an information campaign to 
counter the rumor, while identifying the potential impact of current or future operations 
on the reach and impact of the rumor. The information campaign should take advantage 
of the mediums and informal channels through which the rumor was originally observed; 
it should also take advantage of the formal channels specifically available to the 
organization. The key element of the defensive campaign is consistency and 
reinforcement of the counter-message to the rumor; this process should be based upon 
truth, lest an organization risk its overall credibility by being caught in a lie. Preparing 
the information campaign should also include brainstorming a list of questions relating to 
the rumor that may be posited by the public, and a corresponding list of answers to those 
questions. 
The final stage of the RDP is to implement the neutralization strategy for the 
rumor. This stage involves active measures taken by the organization to counter the 
rumor. The J39 and PAO would jointly implement an information campaign with the aim 
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of reducing environmental ambiguity and uncertainty, thus eroding utility of the  
rumor for the population. The information campaign could encompass the following: 
articles in local newspapers; responses across social media; radio and television 
broadcasts; the use of local indigenous spokespersons; open dialogue with the population 
by hosting town hall meetings; and press conferences that feature a credible spokesperson 
from the organization. After implementing the information campaign, the J39 and J2 
would continue monitoring the rumor to determine whether it was quelled by the 
countermeasures enacted. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Although the PSYOP soldier is charged with countering influence operations 
employed by the enemy, and to be an expert at influencing foreign target audiences 
themselves, doctrine currently does not provide knowledge on how to recognize, counter, 
or effectively craft rumors for offensive purposes. By failing to include the tenets of 
rumor theory into current doctrine and training, influence practitioners have not been 
given the required base knowledge to carry out their duties effectively. Therefore, the 
overall objective of this study explored the military application of rumor theory to 
determine which principles and concepts governing the spread of rumors should be 
incorporated into the future doctrine and training of PSYOP forces. By incorporating the 
principles and concepts of rumor employment and defense discussed in this study into 
future doctrine and training, PSYOP forces will be better suited to influence foreign 
target audiences, and at the same time, be better prepared to counter an adversary’s 
attempts to do the same. 
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